Translated library, started to prove NS_Public

.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 /.lake
 .aider*
+*~

InductiveVerification/Event.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+import Mathlib.Data.Set.Basic
+import Mathlib.Data.Set.Insert
+import InductiveVerification.Message
+
+-- Define the `Event` type
+inductive Event
+| Says : Agent → Agent → Msg → Event
+| Gets : Agent → Msg → Event
+| Notes : Agent → Msg → Event
+
+-- Define the `initState` function
+class HasInitState (α : Type) where
+  initState : α → Set Msg
+
+variable [ hasInitStateAgent : HasInitState Agent ]
+  
+open HasInitState
+  
+-- Define the `bad` set
+abbrev DecidableMem ( A : Set Agent ) := (a : Agent) →  Decidable (a ∈ A)
+class Bad where
+  bad : Set Agent 
+  decidableBad : DecidableMem bad
+  Spy_in_bad : Agent.Spy ∈ bad
+  Server_not_bad : Agent.Server ∉ bad
+
+instance [Bad] : DecidableMem Bad.bad := Bad.decidableBad
+open Bad
+
+-- attribute [simp] Spy_in_bad
+-- attribute [simp] Server_not_bad
+
+instance decidableAgentEq : DecidableEq Agent :=
+  λ a b =>
+    match a, b with
+    | Agent.Spy, Agent.Spy => isTrue rfl
+    | Agent.Spy, Agent.Server => isFalse (λ h => by contradiction)
+    | Agent.Spy, Agent.Friend m => isFalse (λ h => by contradiction)
+    | Agent.Server, Agent.Spy => isFalse (λ h => by contradiction)
+    | Agent.Server, Agent.Server => isTrue rfl
+    | Agent.Server, Agent.Friend m => isFalse (λ h => by contradiction)
+    | Agent.Friend n, Agent.Spy => isFalse (λ h => by contradiction)
+    | Agent.Friend n, Agent.Server => isFalse (λ h => by contradiction)
+    | Agent.Friend n, Agent.Friend m =>
+      if h : n = m then isTrue (congrArg Agent.Friend h) else isFalse (λ h' => h (Agent.Friend.inj h'))
+
+-- instance decidableBad (a: Agent) : Decidable (a ∈ bad) :=
+-- by rw[bad]; apply Set.decidableSingleton
+
+-- Define the `knows` function
+def knows [Bad] : Agent → List Event → Set Msg
+| A, [] => initState A
+| Agent.Spy, Event.Says _ _ X :: evs => insert X (knows Agent.Spy evs)
+| Agent.Spy, Event.Gets _ _ :: evs => knows Agent.Spy evs
+| Agent.Spy, Event.Notes A X :: evs =>
+  if A ∈ bad then insert X (knows Agent.Spy evs) else knows Agent.Spy evs
+| A, Event.Says A' _ X :: evs =>
+  if A = A' then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
+| A, Event.Gets A' X :: evs =>
+  if A = A' then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
+| A, Event.Notes A' X :: evs =>
+  if A = A' then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
+
+-- Define the `spies` abbreviation
+abbrev spies (evs : List Event) [Bad] : Set Msg := knows Agent.Spy evs
+
+-- Define the `used` function
+def used : List Event → Set Msg
+| [] => ⋃ (B : Agent), parts (initState B)
+| Event.Says _ _ X :: evs => parts {X} ∪ used evs
+| Event.Gets _ _ :: evs => used evs
+| Event.Notes _ X :: evs => parts {X} ∪ used evs
+
+-- Lemmas for `used`
+
+ lemma used_mono : used (evs) ⊆ used (ev :: evs) := by
+  cases ev <;> simp[used]
+  
+ lemma Notes_imp_used {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  Event.Notes A X ∈ evs → X ∈ used evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => intro h; cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    intro h
+    cases h with
+    | tail => cases ev
+              · simp [used]; right; aapply ih
+              · simp [used]; aapply ih
+              · simp [used]; right; aapply ih
+    | head => simp [used]; left; apply parts.inj; simp
+
+ lemma Says_imp_used {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ used evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => intro h; cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    intro h
+    cases h with
+    | tail => cases ev
+              · simp [used]; right; aapply ih
+              · simp [used]; aapply ih
+              · simp [used]; right; aapply ih
+    | head => simp [used]; left; apply parts.inj; simp
+
+-- Knowledge subset rules
+lemma knows_subset_knows_Cons [Bad] {A : Agent} {ev : Event} {evs : List Event} :
+  knows A (evs) ⊆ knows A (ev :: evs) := by
+  by_cases h :A = Agent.Spy
+  · rw[h]
+    intro _ _
+    cases ev
+    · simp [knows]; right; assumption
+    · simp [knows]; assumption
+    · simp [knows]; split_ifs
+      · right; assumption
+      · assumption
+  · intro _ _
+    cases ev <;> (simp [knows]; split_ifs; right; assumption; assumption)
+
+lemma initState_subset_knows [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A : Agent} {evs : List Event},
+    initState A ⊆ knows A evs := by
+  intro A evs
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [knows]
+  | cons e evs ih =>
+    apply subset_trans
+    · exact ih
+    · apply knows_subset_knows_Cons
+
+-- Lemmas for `knows`
+@[simp]
+lemma knows_Spy_Says [Bad] {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  knows Agent.Spy (Event.Says A B X :: evs) = insert X (knows Agent.Spy evs) := by
+  simp [knows]
+
+@[simp]
+lemma knows_Spy_Notes [Bad] {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  knows Agent.Spy (Event.Notes A X :: evs) =
+    if A ∈ bad then insert X (knows Agent.Spy evs) else knows Agent.Spy evs := by
+  simp [knows]
+
+@[simp]
+lemma knows_Spy_Gets [Bad] {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  knows Agent.Spy (Event.Gets A X :: evs) = knows Agent.Spy evs := by
+  simp [knows]
+
+lemma Says_imp_knows_Spy [Bad] {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ knows Agent.Spy evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => intro h; cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    intro h
+    cases h with
+    | tail h => cases ev
+                · simp [knows]; right; aapply ih
+                · simp [knows]; aapply ih
+                · simp [knows]; split_ifs
+                  · right; aapply ih
+                  · aapply ih
+    | head h => simp [knows];
+
+lemma Notes_imp_knows_Spy [Bad] {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+  Event.Notes A X ∈ evs → A ∈ bad → X ∈ knows Agent.Spy evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => intro h; cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    intro h h_bad
+    cases h with
+    | head => simp [knows]; split_ifs; left; trivial
+    | tail _ h => apply knows_subset_knows_Cons; apply ih; apply h; apply h_bad
+
+-- Elimination rules: derive contradictions from old Says events containing
+-- items known to be fresh
+lemma Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ parts (knows Agent.Spy evs) := by
+  intro A B X evs h
+  apply parts.inj
+  apply Says_imp_knows_Spy
+  exact h
+
+lemma knows_Spy_partsEs [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ parts (knows Agent.Spy evs) := by
+  exact Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy
+
+lemma Says_imp_analz_Spy [InvKey] [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ analz (knows Agent.Spy evs) := by
+  intro A B X evs h
+  apply analz.inj
+  apply Says_imp_knows_Spy
+  exact h
+
+-- Compatibility for the old "spies" function
+lemma spies_partsEs [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ parts (knows Agent.Spy evs) := by
+  exact knows_Spy_partsEs
+
+lemma Says_imp_spies [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ knows Agent.Spy evs := by
+  exact Says_imp_knows_Spy
+
+lemma parts_insert_spies [Bad] :
+    parts (insert X (knows Agent.Spy evs)) = parts {X} ∪ parts (knows Agent.Spy evs) :=
+by
+  apply parts_insert
+
+-- Knowledge of Agents
+lemma knows_subset_knows_Says [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A A' B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Event.Says A' B X :: evs) := by
+  intro A A' B X evs
+  apply knows_subset_knows_Cons
+
+lemma knows_subset_knows_Notes [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A A' : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Event.Notes A' X :: evs) := by
+  intro A A' X evs
+  apply knows_subset_knows_Cons
+
+lemma knows_subset_knows_Gets [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A A' : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    knows A evs ⊆ knows A (Event.Gets A' X :: evs) := by
+  intro A A' X evs
+  apply knows_subset_knows_Cons
+
+-- Agents know what they say
+lemma Says_imp_knows [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Says A B X ∈ evs → X ∈ knows A evs := by
+  intro A B X evs h
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    cases h with
+    | head => by_cases h: A = Agent.Spy
+              · rw [h]; simp [knows]
+              · simp [knows]
+    | tail => by_cases h: A = Agent.Spy
+              · rw[h]; cases ev
+                · simp [knows]; right; rw[←h]; aapply ih
+                · simp [knows]; rw[←h]; aapply ih
+                · simp [knows]; split_ifs
+                  · right; rw[←h]; aapply ih
+                  · rw[←h]; aapply ih
+              · cases ev <;> (
+                simp [knows]; split_ifs; right; aapply ih; aapply ih)
+    
+-- Agents know what they note
+lemma Notes_imp_knows [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    Event.Notes A X ∈ evs → X ∈ knows A evs := by
+  intro A X evs h
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    cases h with
+    | head => by_cases h: A = Agent.Spy
+              · rw [h]; simp [knows, Spy_in_bad]
+              · simp [knows]
+    | tail => by_cases h: A = Agent.Spy
+              · rw[h]; cases ev
+                · simp [knows]; right; rw[←h]; aapply ih
+                · simp [knows]; rw[←h]; aapply ih
+                · simp [knows]; split_ifs
+                  · right; rw[←h]; aapply ih
+                  · rw[←h]; aapply ih
+              · cases ev <;> (
+                simp [knows]; split_ifs; right; aapply ih; aapply ih)
+
+-- Agents know what they receive
+lemma Gets_imp_knows_agents [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    A ≠ Agent.Spy → Event.Gets A X ∈ evs → X ∈ knows A evs := by
+  intro A X evs h_ne h
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => cases h
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    cases h with
+    | head => simp [knows]
+    | tail => cases ev <;> (simp [knows]; split_ifs; right; aapply ih; aapply ih)
+
+-- What agents DIFFERENT FROM Spy know
+lemma knows_imp_Says_Gets_Notes_initState [Bad] :
+  ∀ {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event},
+    X ∈ knows A evs → A ≠ Agent.Spy →
+    ∃ B, Event.Says A B X ∈ evs ∨ Event.Gets A X ∈ evs ∨ Event.Notes A X ∈ evs ∨ X ∈ initState A := by
+  intro _ _ evs h _
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [knows] at h; exists Agent.Server; simp_all
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    cases ev
+    · simp [knows] at h; split_ifs at h with eq
+      · cases h with
+        | inl h₁ => grind
+        | inr h' => apply ih at h'; cases h' with | intro A'; exists A'; grind
+      · apply ih at h; cases h with | intro A'; exists A'; grind
+    · simp [knows] at h; split_ifs at h with eq
+      · cases h with
+        | inl h₁ => simp[h₁, eq]; exact ⟨Agent.Server⟩
+        | inr h' => apply ih at h'; cases h' with | intro A'; exists A'; grind
+      · apply ih at h; cases h with | intro A'; exists A'; grind
+    · simp [knows] at h; split_ifs at h with eq
+      · cases h with
+        | inl h₁ => simp[h₁, eq]; exact ⟨Agent.Server⟩
+        | inr h' => apply ih at h'; cases h' with | intro A'; exists A'; grind
+      · apply ih at h; cases h with | intro A'; exists A'; grind
+
+-- auxiliary lemma
+
+lemma knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState_aux
+  [Bad] {X : Msg} {ev : Event} {evs : List Event} :
+  (∃ A B, Event.Says A B X ∈ evs ∨ Event.Notes A X ∈ evs ∨ X ∈ initState Agent.Spy)
+  → (∃ A B,
+      Event.Says A B X ∈ ev :: evs ∨ Event.Notes A X ∈ ev :: evs ∨ X ∈ initState Agent.Spy
+  ) := by
+    intro h
+    cases h with | intro A h =>
+    cases h with | intro B h => 
+    exists A; exists B
+    cases h with
+    | inl => left; right; assumption
+    | inr h => right; cases h
+               · left; right; assumption
+               · right; assumption
+
+-- What the Spy knows
+lemma knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState [Bad] {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+    X ∈ knows Agent.Spy evs →
+    ∃ A B, Event.Says A B X ∈ evs ∨ Event.Notes A X ∈ evs ∨ X ∈ initState Agent.Spy := by
+  intro h
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [knows] at h; exists Agent.Server; exists Agent.Server; simp_all
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    cases ev with
+    | Says A' B' =>
+      simp [knows] at h; cases h with
+      | inl => exists A'; exists B'; simp_all;
+      | inr h => 
+        apply ih at h; aapply knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState_aux
+    | Gets => 
+      simp [knows] at h; apply ih at h; aapply knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState_aux
+    | Notes A' X' => 
+      simp [knows] at h; split_ifs at h with A'_bad
+      · cases h with
+        | inl h => rw[h]; exists A'; exists A'; simp
+        | inr h => apply ih at h; aapply knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState_aux
+      · apply ih at h; aapply knows_Spy_imp_Says_Notes_initState_aux
+
+-- Parts of what the Spy knows are a subset of what is used
+lemma parts_knows_Spy_subset_used [Bad] :
+    parts (knows Agent.Spy evs) ⊆ used evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [used, knows]; intro _ _; simp; exists Agent.Spy;
+  | cons ev evs ih =>
+    cases ev
+    · simp[used, knows]; apply subset_trans; apply ih; simp
+    · simp[used, knows]; assumption
+    · simp[used, knows]; split_ifs with ABad
+      · simp; apply subset_trans; apply ih; simp
+      · apply subset_trans; apply ih; simp
+
+-- Parts of what the Spy knows are a subset of what is used
+lemma usedI [Bad] :
+    X ∈ parts (knows Agent.Spy evs) → X ∈ used evs := by
+  intro h
+  apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used
+  exact h
+
+-- Initial state messages are part of the used set
+
+lemma initState_into_used {B : Agent} {evs : List Event} :
+    parts (initState B) ⊆ used evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [used]; apply Set.subset_iUnion (parts ∘ initState) B
+  | cons ev =>
+    cases ev <;> (simp[used]; try apply Set.subset_union_of_subset_right)
+    all_goals assumption
+
+-- Simplification rules for `used`
+
+@[simp]
+lemma used_Says {A B : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+    used (Event.Says A B X :: evs) = parts {X} ∪ used evs := by
+  simp [used]
+
+
+@[simp]
+lemma used_Notes {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+    used (Event.Notes A X :: evs) = parts {X} ∪ used evs := by
+  simp [used]
+
+
+@[simp]
+lemma used_Gets {A : Agent} {X : Msg} {evs : List Event} :
+    used (Event.Gets A X :: evs) = used evs := by
+  simp [used]
+
+
+lemma used_nil_subset {evs : List Event} :
+    used [] ⊆ used evs := by
+  have B := Agent.Server
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp
+  | cons head tail ih =>
+  apply subset_trans (b := used tail)
+  · assumption
+  · exact used_mono
+  
+-- Keys for parts insert
+open InvKey
+
+omit hasInitStateAgent in
+
+lemma keysFor_parts_insert {K : Key} {X : Msg} {G H : Set Msg} [InvKey]:
+    K ∈ keysFor (parts (insert X G)) →
+    X ∈ synth (analz H) →
+    K ∈ keysFor (parts (G ∪ H)) ∪ invKey '' {K | Msg.Key K ∈ parts H} := by
+  intro h h₂
+  rw[parts_union, keysFor_union]
+  rcases h with ⟨K', ⟨⟨X', h⟩, r⟩⟩
+  by_cases KkfpG: K∈ keysFor (parts G)
+  · left; left; assumption
+  · rw[Set.union_assoc]; right; rw[←keysFor_synth]; rw[parts_insert] at h
+    cases h with
+    | inl h => 
+      apply Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor at h; rw[r] at h
+      apply keysFor_mono (a := parts {X})
+      · apply synth_subset_iff.mpr; rw[←synth_subset_iff]
+        apply subset_trans (b := parts (synth (analz H)))
+        · apply parts_mono; simp; assumption
+        · rw[parts_synth, parts_analz]; apply sup_le
+          · exact synth_increasing
+          · apply synth_mono; exact analz_subset_parts
+      · assumption
+    | inr h => apply Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor at h; rw[r] at h; contradiction

InductiveVerification/Message.lean

@@ -16,19 +16,17 @@ import Mathlib.Tactic.NthRewrite
 -- Keys are integers
 abbrev Key := Nat
 
--- Define constants
-def all_symmetric : Bool := true -- true if all keys are symmetric
-
 -- Define the inverse of a symmetric key
-def invKey : Key → Key := fun k => k -- Placeholder definition
+class InvKey where
+  invKey : Key → Key
+  all_symmetric : Bool
+  invKey_spec : ∀ K : Key,  invKey (invKey K) = K
+  invKey_symmetric : all_symmetric → invKey = id
 
--- Specification for invKey
-axiom invKey_spec : ∀ K : Key, invKey (invKey K) = K
-axiom invKey_symmetric : all_symmetric → invKey = id
+open InvKey
 
--- Define the set of symmetric keys
 @[grind]
-def symKeys : Set Key := { K | invKey K = K }
+def symKeys [InvKey] : Set Key := { K | invKey K = K }
 
 -- Define the datatype for agents
 @[grind]
@@ -55,6 +53,7 @@ end Msg
 
 open Msg
 open Agent
+
 -- Define HPair
 def HPair (X Y : Msg) : Msg :=
   ⦃Hash ⦃X, Y⦄, Y⦄
@@ -62,8 +61,7 @@ def HPair (X Y : Msg) : Msg :=
 notation "⦃" x ", " y "⦄ₕ" => HPair x y
 
 -- Define keysFor
-@[simp]
-def keysFor (H : Set Msg) : Set Key :=
+def keysFor [InvKey] (H : Set Msg) : Set Key :=
   invKey '' { K | ∃ X, Crypt K X ∈ H }
 
 -- Define the inductive set `parts`
@@ -110,7 +108,7 @@ lemma Nonce_Key_image_eq {A : Set Key} {x : Nat} :
 
 -- Lemma: Inverse of keys
 @[simp]
-lemma invKey_eq (K K' : Key) : (invKey K = invKey K') ↔ (K = K') := by
+lemma invKey_eq (K K' : Key) [InvKey] : (invKey K = invKey K') ↔ (K = K') := by
   apply Iff.intro
   case mp =>
     intro h
@@ -121,20 +119,19 @@ lemma invKey_eq (K K' : Key) : (invKey K = invKey K') ↔ (K = K') := by
 
 -- Lemmas for the `keysFor` operator
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_empty : keysFor ∅ = ∅ := by
-  simp
+lemma keysFor_empty [InvKey] : keysFor ∅ = ∅ := by
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_union (H H' : Set Msg) : keysFor (H ∪ H') = keysFor H ∪ keysFor H' := by
-  simp
+lemma keysFor_union (H H' : Set Msg) [InvKey] : keysFor (H ∪ H') = keysFor H ∪ keysFor H' := by
+  simp[keysFor]
   ext
   constructor
   · intro h; simp_all; grind
   · intro h; simp_all; grind
 
 -- Monotonicity
-@[simp]
-lemma keysFor_mono: Monotone keysFor := by
+lemma keysFor_mono [InvKey] : Monotone keysFor := by
   simp_intro _ _ sub _ h
   rcases h with ⟨K, ⟨⟨X, _⟩, _⟩⟩ ; exists K; apply And.intro
   · exists X; aapply sub
@@ -142,67 +139,63 @@ lemma keysFor_mono: Monotone keysFor := by
 
 -- Lemmas for `keysFor` with specific message types
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_Agent (A : Agent) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_Agent (A : Agent) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert (Agent A) H) = keysFor H := by
-  simp
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_Nonce (N : Nat) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_Nonce (N : Nat) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert (Nonce N) H) = keysFor H := by
-  simp
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_Number (N : Nat) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_Number (N : Nat) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert (Msg.Hash (Nonce N)) H) = keysFor H := by
-  simp
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_Key (K : Key) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_Key (K : Key) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert (Key K) H) = keysFor H := by
-  simp
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_Hash (X : Msg) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_Hash (X : Msg) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert (Hash X) H) = keysFor H := by
-  simp
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_MPair (X Y : Msg) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_MPair (X Y : Msg) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert ⦃X, Y⦄ H) = keysFor H := by
-  simp
+  simp[keysFor]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_Crypt (K : Key) (X : Msg) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma keysFor_insert_Crypt (K : Key) (X : Msg) (H : Set Msg) [InvKey] :
     keysFor (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (invKey K) (keysFor H) := by
-  simp[insert,Set.insert,invKey]
+  simp[insert,Set.insert,keysFor]
   ext
   grind
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_image_Key (E : Set Key) : keysFor (Key '' E) = ∅ := by
-  simp
+lemma keysFor_image_Key (E : Set Key) [InvKey] : keysFor (Key '' E) = ∅ := by
+  simp[keysFor]
 
-@[simp]
-lemma Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor (K : Key) (X : Msg) (H : Set Msg) :
+lemma Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor {K : Key} {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] :
     Crypt K X ∈ H → invKey K ∈ keysFor H := by
   intro h
-  simp
+  simp[invKey_eq,keysFor]
   exact ⟨_, h⟩
-
+  
 -- MPair_parts lemma
-@[simp]
 lemma MPair_parts {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} { P : Prop} :
   ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ parts H → (parts H X  → parts H Y → P) → P :=
 by
   grind
 
 -- parts_increasing lemma
-@[simp]
 lemma parts_increasing {H : Set Msg} : H ⊆ parts H :=
   λ _ hx => parts.inj hx
 
 -- parts_empty_aux lemma
-@[simp]
 lemma parts_empty_aux {X : Msg} : parts ∅ X → False :=
 by
   intro h
@@ -300,7 +293,6 @@ by
       | body _ ih => exact parts.body ih
 
 -- parts_insert_subset lemma
-@[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_subset {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} :
   insert X (parts H) ⊆ parts (insert X H) :=
 by
@@ -315,7 +307,6 @@ by
 
 
 -- Idempotence and transitivity lemmas for `parts`
-@[simp]
 lemma parts_partsD {H : Set Msg} : parts (parts H) ⊆ parts H :=
 by
   intro x h
@@ -336,23 +327,23 @@ lemma parts_idem {H : Set Msg} : parts (parts H) = parts H :=
 lemma parts_subset_iff {G H : Set Msg} : (G ⊆ parts H) ↔ (parts G ⊆ parts H) :=
 by apply partsClosureOperator.le_closure_iff
 
-@[simp]
 lemma parts_trans {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ parts G → G ⊆ parts H → X ∈ parts H :=
 by intro a b; apply parts_mono at b; rw[parts_idem] at b; apply b; apply a;
 
 -- Cut lemma
-@[simp]
 lemma parts_cut {G H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   Y ∈ parts (insert X G) → X ∈ parts H → Y ∈ parts (G ∪ H) :=
 by
   intro a b; rw[parts_union]; rw[parts_insert] at a; cases a <;> grind[parts_trans]
   
 @[simp]
-lemma parts_cut_mono {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
-  X ∈ parts H → parts (insert X G) ⊆ parts (G ∪ H) :=
-by grind[parts_cut]
-
+lemma parts_cut_eq :
+  X ∈ parts H → (parts (insert X H) = parts H) :=
+by
+  intro h; simp[parts_insert]; rw[parts_idem]
+  apply_rules [parts_subset_iff.mp, Set.singleton_subset_iff.mpr]
+  
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_Agent {H : Set Msg} {agt : Agent} :
   parts (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (parts H) :=
@@ -367,6 +358,11 @@ by
       | body _ a_ih => cases a_ih; contradiction; right; aapply parts.body
     | inr h => right; assumption
   · apply parts_insert_subset
+  
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_Agent :
+  parts {Agent agt} = {Agent agt} := by
+  rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Agent, parts_empty]
 
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_Nonce {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} :
@@ -383,6 +379,11 @@ by
     | inr h => right; assumption
   · apply parts_insert_subset
 
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_Nonce :
+  parts {Nonce N} = {Nonce N} := by
+  rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Nonce, parts_empty]
+
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_Number {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} :
   parts (insert (Number N) H) = insert (Number N) (parts H) :=
@@ -398,6 +399,11 @@ by
     | inr h => right; assumption
   · apply parts_insert_subset
 
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_Number :
+  parts {Number N} = {Number N} := by
+  rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Number, parts_empty]
+
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_Key {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} :
   parts (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (parts H) :=
@@ -413,6 +419,11 @@ by
     | inr h => right; assumption
   · apply parts_insert_subset
 
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_Key :
+  parts {Key K} = {Key K} := by
+  rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty]
+
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_Hash {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   parts (insert (Hash X) H) = insert (Hash X) (parts H) :=
@@ -428,6 +439,11 @@ by
     | inr h => right; assumption
   · apply parts_insert_subset
 
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_Hash :
+  parts {Hash H} = {Hash H} := by
+  rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Hash, parts_empty]
+
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_Crypt {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
   parts (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (parts (insert X H)) :=
@@ -453,6 +469,17 @@ by
       apply parts.inj
       trivial
       
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_Crypt :
+  parts {Crypt K X} = {Crypt K X} ∪ parts {X} := by
+  rw[
+    Set.singleton_def,
+    parts_insert_Crypt,
+    ←Set.singleton_def,
+    Set.insert_union,
+    Set.empty_union
+  ]
+
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_insert_MPair {H: Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   parts (insert ⦃X, Y⦄ H) = insert ⦃X, Y⦄ (parts (insert X (insert Y H))) :=
@@ -492,6 +519,17 @@ by
             trivial;
         | inr => right; assumption;
 
+@[simp]
+lemma parts_singleton_MPair :
+  parts {⦃X, Y⦄} = {⦃X, Y⦄} ∪ parts (insert X {Y}) := by
+  rw[
+    Set.singleton_def,
+    parts_insert_MPair,
+    ←Set.singleton_def,
+    Set.insert_union,
+    Set.empty_union
+  ]
+
 @[simp]
 lemma parts_image_Key {N : Set Key} : parts (Key '' N) = Key '' N :=
 by 
@@ -531,7 +569,7 @@ by
                     simp_all;
 
 -- Inductive relation "analz"
-inductive analz (H : Set Msg) : Set Msg
+inductive analz [InvKey] (H : Set Msg) : Set Msg
   | inj {X : Msg} : X ∈ H → analz H X
   | fst {X Y : Msg} : ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ analz H → analz H X
   | snd {X Y : Msg} : ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ analz H → analz H Y
@@ -539,9 +577,9 @@ inductive analz (H : Set Msg) : Set Msg
       Crypt K X ∈ analz H → Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H → analz H X
 
 -- Monotonicity
-lemma analz_mono : Monotone analz :=
+lemma analz_mono [InvKey] : Monotone analz :=
 by 
-  intro A B h₁ X h₂
+  intro _ _ h₁ _ h₂
   induction h₂ with
   | inj h => exact analz.inj (h₁ h)
   | fst h ih => exact analz.fst ih
@@ -549,8 +587,8 @@ by
   | decrypt h₁ h₂ ih₁ ih₂ => exact analz.decrypt ih₁ ih₂
 
 -- Making it safe speeds up proofs
-@[simp]
-lemma MPair_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} {P : Prop} :
+-- @[simp]
+lemma MPair_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} {P : Prop} [InvKey] :
   ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ analz H → (analz H X → analz H Y → P) → P :=
 by
   intro h ih
@@ -559,10 +597,10 @@ by
   · apply analz.snd h
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_increasing {H : Set Msg} : H ⊆ analz H :=
+lemma analz_increasing [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} : H ⊆ analz H :=
   λ _ hx => analz.inj hx
 
-lemma analz_into_parts {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} : X ∈ analz H → X ∈ parts H :=
+lemma analz_into_parts {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} [InvKey] : X ∈ analz H → X ∈ parts H :=
 by
   intro h
   induction h with
@@ -571,11 +609,11 @@ by
   | snd _ ih => aapply parts.snd
   | decrypt _ _ ih₁ => aapply parts.body
 
-lemma analz_subset_parts {H : Set Msg} : analz H ⊆ parts H :=
+lemma analz_subset_parts {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : analz H ⊆ parts H :=
   λ _ hx => analz_into_parts hx
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_parts {H : Set Msg} : analz (parts H) = parts H :=
+lemma analz_parts {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : analz (parts H) = parts H :=
 by
   ext X; constructor
   · intro h; induction h with
@@ -585,12 +623,12 @@ by
     | decrypt => aapply parts.body;
   · apply analz_increasing;
 
-lemma not_parts_not_analz {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma not_parts_not_analz {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   X ∉ parts H → X ∉ analz H :=
   λ h₁ h₂ => h₁ (analz_into_parts h₂)
 
 @[simp]
-lemma parts_analz {H : Set Msg} : parts (analz H) = parts H :=
+lemma parts_analz {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : parts (analz H) = parts H :=
   by 
     ext; constructor;
     · intro h; induction h with
@@ -601,18 +639,18 @@ lemma parts_analz {H : Set Msg} : parts (analz H) = parts H :=
     · apply parts_mono; apply analz_increasing;
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insertI {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} :
+lemma analz_insertI {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] :
   insert X (analz H) ⊆ analz (insert X H) :=
 by
   intro x hx
   cases hx with
   | inl h => apply analz.inj; left; assumption;
-  | inr h => exact analz_mono (Set.subset_insert _ _) h
+  | inr h => aapply analz_mono (Set.subset_insert _ _)
 
 -- General equational properties
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_empty : analz ∅ = ∅ :=
+lemma analz_empty [InvKey] : analz ∅ = ∅ :=
 by 
   ext; constructor;
   · intro h; induction h <;> contradiction;
@@ -620,25 +658,25 @@ by
 
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_union {G H : Set Msg} : analz G ∪ analz H ⊆ analz (G ∪ H) :=
+lemma analz_union {G H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : analz G ∪ analz H ⊆ analz (G ∪ H) :=
   by
     intro x hx
     cases hx with
-    | inl hG => exact analz_mono (Set.subset_union_left) hG; 
-    | inr hH => exact analz_mono (Set.subset_union_right) hH
+    | inl hG => aapply analz_mono (Set.subset_union_left)
+    | inr hH => aapply analz_mono (Set.subset_union_right)
 
-lemma analz_insert {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] :
   insert X (analz H) ⊆ analz (insert X H) :=
   by
     intro x hx
     cases hx with
     | inl h => apply analz.inj; left; assumption
-    | inr h => exact analz_mono (Set.subset_insert _ _) h
+    | inr h => aapply analz_mono (Set.subset_insert _ _)
 
 -- Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_Agent {H : Set Msg} {agt : Agent} :
+lemma analz_insert_Agent {H : Set Msg} {agt : Agent} [InvKey] :
   analz (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (analz H) :=
   by
     ext
@@ -656,7 +694,7 @@ lemma analz_insert_Agent {H : Set Msg} {agt : Agent} :
     · apply analz_insert
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_Nonce {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} :
+lemma analz_insert_Nonce {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} [InvKey] :
   analz (insert (Nonce N) H) = insert (Nonce N) (analz H) :=
   by
     ext
@@ -674,7 +712,7 @@ lemma analz_insert_Nonce {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} :
     · apply analz_insert
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_Number {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} :
+lemma analz_insert_Number {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} [InvKey] :
   analz (insert (Number N) H) = insert (Number N) (analz H) :=
   by
     ext
@@ -692,7 +730,7 @@ lemma analz_insert_Number {H : Set Msg} {N : Nat} :
     · apply analz_insert
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_Hash {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_Hash {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   analz (insert (Hash X) H) = insert (Hash X) (analz H) :=
   by
     ext
@@ -710,7 +748,7 @@ lemma analz_insert_Hash {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
     · apply analz_insert
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_Key {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} :
+lemma analz_insert_Key {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} [InvKey] :
   K ∉ keysFor (analz H) →
   analz (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (analz H) :=
   by
@@ -733,7 +771,7 @@ lemma analz_insert_Key {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} :
     · apply analz_insert
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_MPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_MPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} [InvKey] :
   analz (insert ⦃X, Y⦄ H) = insert ⦃X, Y⦄ (analz (insert X (insert Y H))) :=
   by
     ext
@@ -767,7 +805,7 @@ lemma analz_insert_MPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
         | snd => aapply analz.snd
         | decrypt => aapply analz.decrypt
 
-lemma analz_insert_Decrypt {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_Decrypt {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H →
   analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H)) :=
 by
@@ -796,9 +834,8 @@ by
       | snd => aapply analz.snd
       | decrypt => aapply analz.decrypt
 
--- TODO split into two lemmata
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_Crypt {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_Crypt {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   (Key (invKey K) ∉ analz H) →
   (analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (analz H)) :=
 by
@@ -817,7 +854,7 @@ by
     | inr => apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert; assumption
           
 -- This rule supposes "for the sake of argument" that we have the key.
-lemma analz_insert_Crypt_subset {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_Crypt_subset {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) ⊆ insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H)) :=
 by
   intro Y h
@@ -835,7 +872,7 @@ by
   | inr => aapply analz.decrypt
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_image_Key {N : Set Key} : analz (Key '' N) = Key '' N :=
+lemma analz_image_Key {N : Set Key} [InvKey] : analz (Key '' N) = Key '' N :=
 by
   apply Set.ext
   intro X
@@ -848,8 +885,8 @@ by
 
 -- Idempotence and transitivity
 
-@[simp]
-lemma analz_analzD {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} : X ∈ analz (analz H) → X ∈ analz H :=
+lemma analz_analzD [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+  X ∈ analz (analz H) → X ∈ analz H :=
 by
   intro h
   induction h with
@@ -858,19 +895,24 @@ by
   | snd h ih => exact analz.snd ih
   | decrypt h₁ h₂ ih₁ ih₂ => exact analz.decrypt ih₁ ih₂
  
-abbrev analzClosureOperator : ClosureOperator (Set Msg) :=
-  ClosureOperator.mk' analz analz_mono @analz_increasing @analz_analzD
+@[simp]
+abbrev analzClosureOperator [InvKey] : ClosureOperator (Set Msg) :=
+  ClosureOperator.mk'
+  analz (analz_mono)
+  (λ x ↦ @analz_increasing _ x)
+  (λ x ↦ @analz_analzD _ x)
+
+lemma analz_idem {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : analz (analz H) = analz H :=
+by
+  apply analzClosureOperator.idempotent
+  
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_idem {H : Set Msg} : analz (analz H) = analz H :=
-  by apply analzClosureOperator.idempotent
-
-@[simp]
-lemma analz_subset_iff {G H : Set Msg} : (G ⊆ analz H) ↔ (analz G ⊆ analz H) :=
+lemma analz_subset_iff {G H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : (G ⊆ analz H) ↔ (analz G ⊆ analz H) :=
   by apply analzClosureOperator.le_closure_iff
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_trans {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_trans {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   X ∈ analz G → G ⊆ analz H → X ∈ analz H :=
 by
   intro hG hGH
@@ -878,7 +920,7 @@ by
 
 -- Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_cut {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma analz_cut {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} [InvKey] :
   Y ∈ analz (insert X H) → X ∈ analz H → Y ∈ analz H :=
 by
   intro hY _
@@ -887,7 +929,7 @@ by
 
 -- Simplification of messages involving forwarding of unknown components
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_eq {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_eq {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   X ∈ analz H → analz (insert X H) = analz H :=
 by
   intro
@@ -898,19 +940,19 @@ by
 
 -- A congruence rule for "analz"
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_subset_cong {G G' H H' : Set Msg} :
+lemma analz_subset_cong {G G' H H' : Set Msg} [InvKey] :
   analz G ⊆ analz G' → analz H ⊆ analz H' → analz (G ∪ H) ⊆ analz (G' ∪ H') :=
 by
   intro hG hH
   have a_sub := analz_subset_iff (G := G ∪ H) (H := G' ∪ H')
   apply a_sub.mp
   apply subset_trans (b := analz G ∪ analz H)
-  apply Set.union_subset_union (h₁ := @analz_increasing (H := G)) (h₂ := @analz_increasing (H := H))
+  apply Set.union_subset_union (h₁ := @analz_increasing _ (H := G)) (h₂ := @analz_increasing _ (H := H))
   apply subset_trans (b := analz G' ∪ analz H')
   apply Set.union_subset_union (h₁ := hG) (h₂ := hH)
   apply analz_union
 
-lemma analz_cong {G G' H H' : Set Msg} :
+lemma analz_cong {G G' H H' : Set Msg} [InvKey] :
   analz G = analz G' → analz H = analz H' → analz (G ∪ H) = analz (G' ∪ H') :=
 by
   intro hG hH
@@ -920,7 +962,7 @@ by
   · apply analz_subset_cong; rw[Eq.comm] at hG; aapply Eq.subset; rw[Eq.comm] at hH; aapply Eq.subset
 
 
-lemma analz_insert_cong {H H' : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_cong {H H' : Set Msg} {X : Msg} [InvKey] :
   analz H = analz H' → analz (insert X H) = analz (insert X H') :=
 by
   intro hH
@@ -928,7 +970,7 @@ by
   exact analz_cong rfl hH
 
 -- If there are no pairs or encryptions, then analz does nothing
-lemma analz_trivial {H : Set Msg} :
+lemma analz_trivial [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} :
   (∀ X Y, ⦃X, Y⦄ ∉ H) → (∀ X K, Crypt K X ∉ H) → analz H = H :=
 by
   intro hPairs hCrypts
@@ -945,7 +987,7 @@ by
 
 -- Inductive relation "synth"
 
-inductive synth (H : Set Msg) : Set Msg
+inductive synth [InvKey] (H : Set Msg) : Set Msg
   | inj {X : Msg} : X ∈ H → synth H X
   | agent {agt : Agent} : synth H (Agent agt)
   | number {n : Nat} : synth H (Number n)
@@ -954,7 +996,7 @@ inductive synth (H : Set Msg) : Set Msg
   | crypt {K : Key} {X : Msg} : synth H X → Key K ∈ H → synth H (Crypt K X)
 
 -- Monotonicity
-lemma synth_mono : Monotone synth := by
+lemma synth_mono [InvKey] : Monotone synth := by
   intro _ _ h _ hx
   induction hx with
   | inj hG => exact synth.inj (h hG)
@@ -966,18 +1008,18 @@ lemma synth_mono : Monotone synth := by
 
 -- Simplification rules for `synth`
 @[simp]
-lemma synth_increasing {H : Set Msg} : H ⊆ synth H :=
+lemma synth_increasing [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} : H ⊆ synth H :=
   λ _ hx => synth.inj hx
 
 -- Unions
-lemma synth_union {G H : Set Msg} : synth G ∪ synth H ⊆ synth (G ∪ H) :=
+lemma synth_union [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} : synth G ∪ synth H ⊆ synth (G ∪ H) :=
 by
   intro x hx
   cases hx with
   | inl hG => exact synth_mono (Set.subset_union_left) hG
   | inr hH => exact synth_mono (Set.subset_union_right) hH
 
-lemma synth_insert {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} :
+lemma synth_insert [InvKey] {X : Msg} {H : Set Msg} :
   insert X (synth H) ⊆ synth (insert X H) :=
 by
   intro x hx
@@ -986,8 +1028,8 @@ by
   | inr h => exact synth_mono (Set.subset_insert _ _) h
 
 -- Idempotence and transitivity
-@[simp]
-lemma synth_synthD {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} : X ∈ synth (synth H) → X ∈ synth H :=
+lemma synth_synthD [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+  X ∈ synth (synth H) → X ∈ synth H :=
 by
   intro h
   induction h with
@@ -998,33 +1040,35 @@ by
   | mpair _ _ ihX ihY => exact synth.mpair ihX ihY
   | crypt _ a => cases a; aapply synth.crypt;
   
-abbrev synthClosureOperator : ClosureOperator (Set Msg) :=
-  ClosureOperator.mk' synth synth_mono @synth_increasing @synth_synthD
+abbrev synthClosureOperator [InvKey] : ClosureOperator (Set Msg) :=
+  ClosureOperator.mk' synth synth_mono 
+  (λ x ↦ @synth_increasing _ x)
+  (λ x ↦ @synth_synthD _ x)
 
 @[simp]
-lemma synth_idem {H : Set Msg} : synth (synth H) = synth H :=
+lemma synth_idem {H : Set Msg} [InvKey] : synth (synth H) = synth H :=
   by apply synthClosureOperator.idempotent
 
 @[simp]
-lemma synth_subset_iff {G H : Set Msg} : (G ⊆ synth H) ↔ (synth G ⊆ synth H) :=
+lemma synth_subset_iff [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} : (G ⊆ synth H) ↔ (synth G ⊆ synth H) :=
 by apply synthClosureOperator.le_closure_iff
 
-@[simp, grind]
-lemma synth_trans {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+@[simp]
+lemma synth_trans [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ synth G → G ⊆ synth H → X ∈ synth H :=
 by
   intro hG hGH; apply synth_mono at hGH; rw[synth_idem] at hGH; apply hGH; apply hG
 
 -- Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe
 @[simp]
-lemma synth_cut {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma synth_cut [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   Y ∈ synth (insert X H) → X ∈ synth H → Y ∈ synth H :=
 by
   intro hY hX; apply synth_trans; apply hY
   intro a h; cases h; simp_all; aapply synth.inj
 
 @[simp]
-lemma Crypt_synth_eq {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
+lemma Crypt_synth_eq [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
   Key K ∉ H → (Crypt K X ∈ synth H ↔ Crypt K X ∈ H) :=
 by
   intro hK
@@ -1035,7 +1079,7 @@ by
     exact synth.inj h
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_synth {H : Set Msg} :
+lemma keysFor_synth [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} :
   keysFor (synth H) = keysFor H ∪ invKey '' {K | Key K ∈ H} :=
 by
   ext K
@@ -1063,7 +1107,7 @@ by
 -- Combinations of parts, analz, and synth
 
 @[simp]
-lemma parts_synth {H : Set Msg} : parts (synth H) = parts H ∪ synth H :=
+lemma parts_synth [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} : parts (synth H) = parts H ∪ synth H :=
 by
   apply Set.ext
   intro X
@@ -1095,14 +1139,14 @@ by
     | inr h => exact parts.inj h
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_analz_Un {G H : Set Msg} : analz (analz G ∪ H) = analz (G ∪ H) :=
+lemma analz_analz_Un [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} : analz (analz G ∪ H) = analz (G ∪ H) :=
 by
   apply analz_cong
   · exact analz_idem
   · trivial
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_synth_Un {G H : Set Msg} : analz (synth G ∪ H) = analz (G ∪ H) ∪ synth G :=
+lemma analz_synth_Un [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} : analz (synth G ∪ H) = analz (G ∪ H) ∪ synth G :=
 by
   ext
   constructor
@@ -1141,7 +1185,7 @@ by
     · apply analz_subset_iff.mpr; apply analz_mono; exact le_sup_left
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_synth {H : Set Msg} : analz (synth H) = analz H ∪ synth H :=
+lemma analz_synth [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} : analz (synth H) = analz H ∪ synth H :=
   by have asu := analz_synth_Un (G := H) (H := ∅); simp_all
 
 -- For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces
@@ -1155,7 +1199,7 @@ by
   · apply parts_mono; simp_all
   · trivial
 
-lemma Fake_parts_insert {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma Fake_parts_insert [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ synth (analz H) → parts (insert X H) ⊆ synth (analz H) ∪ parts H :=
 by
   intro hX
@@ -1166,13 +1210,13 @@ by
     · rw [parts_analz]
   · apply le_sup_of_le_right; trivial
 
-lemma Fake_parts_insert_in_Un {H : Set Msg} {X Z : Msg} :
+lemma Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Z : Msg} :
   Z ∈ parts (insert X H) → X ∈ synth (analz H) → Z ∈ synth (analz H) ∪ parts H :=
 by
   intro hZ hX
   exact Set.mem_of_subset_of_mem (Fake_parts_insert hX) hZ
 
-lemma Fake_analz_insert {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma Fake_analz_insert [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ synth (analz G) → analz (insert X H) ⊆ synth (analz G) ∪ analz (G ∪ H) :=
 by
   intro
@@ -1181,7 +1225,7 @@ by
   · rw[analz_synth_Un, Set.union_comm, analz_analz_Un]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_conj_parts {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_conj_parts [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   (X ∈ analz H ∧ X ∈ parts H) ↔ X ∈ analz H :=
   by
     constructor
@@ -1191,7 +1235,7 @@ lemma analz_conj_parts {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
       exact ⟨h, analz_subset_parts h⟩
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_disj_parts {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_disj_parts [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   (X ∈ analz H ∨ X ∈ parts H) ↔ X ∈ parts H :=
   by
     constructor
@@ -1203,7 +1247,7 @@ lemma analz_disj_parts {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
       exact Or.inr h
 
 @[simp]
-lemma MPair_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma MPair_synth_analz [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ synth (analz H) ↔ X ∈ synth (analz H) ∧ Y ∈ synth (analz H) :=
   by
     constructor
@@ -1214,7 +1258,7 @@ lemma MPair_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
       · apply And.intro <;> assumption
     · intro h; exact synth.mpair h.1 h.2
 
-lemma Crypt_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
+lemma Crypt_synth_analz [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
   Key K ∈ analz H → Key (invKey K) ∈ analz H → ((Crypt K X ∈ synth (analz H)) ↔ X ∈ synth (analz H)) :=
   by
   intro _ _
@@ -1225,7 +1269,7 @@ lemma Crypt_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {K : Key} {X : Msg} :
   · intro _; aapply synth.crypt
 
 @[simp]
-lemma Hash_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma Hash_synth_analz [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   X ∉ synth (analz H) → ((Hash ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ synth (analz H)) ↔ Hash ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ analz H) :=
   by
   intro _
@@ -1241,27 +1285,27 @@ lemma Hash_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
 
 -- Freeness
 
-@[simp]
+-- @[simp]
 lemma Agent_neq_HPair {A : Agent} {X Y : Msg} : Agent A ≠ ⦃X, Y⦄ₕ :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
-@[simp]
+-- @[simp]
 lemma Nonce_neq_HPair {N : Nat} {X Y : Msg} : Nonce N ≠ ⦃X, Y⦄ₕ :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
-@[simp]
+-- @[simp]
 lemma Number_neq_HPair {N : Nat} {X Y : Msg} : Number N ≠ ⦃X, Y⦄ₕ :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
-@[simp]
+-- @[simp]
 lemma Key_neq_HPair {K : Key} {X Y : Msg} : Key K ≠ ⦃X, Y⦄ₕ :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
-@[simp]
+-- @[simp]
 lemma Hash_neq_HPair {Z X Y : Msg} : Hash Z ≠ ⦃X, Y⦄ₕ :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
-@[simp]
+-- @[simp]
 lemma Crypt_neq_HPair {K : Key} {X' X Y : Msg} : Crypt K X' ≠ ⦃X, Y⦄ₕ :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
@@ -1280,7 +1324,7 @@ lemma HPair_eq_MPair {X' Y' X Y : Msg} : (⦃X, Y⦄ₕ = ⦃X', Y'⦄) ↔ (X'
 -- Specialized laws, proved in terms of those for Hash and MPair
 
 @[simp]
-lemma keysFor_insert_HPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma keysFor_insert_HPair [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   keysFor (insert (⦃X, Y⦄ₕ) H) = keysFor H :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
@@ -1288,21 +1332,19 @@ lemma keysFor_insert_HPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
 lemma parts_insert_HPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   parts (insert (⦃X, Y⦄ₕ) H) = insert (⦃X, Y⦄ₕ) (insert (Hash ⦃X, Y⦄) (parts (insert Y H))) :=
 by
-  simp [HPair]; rw[←Set.union_empty (a:= {⦃Hash ⦃X, Y⦄, Y⦄}), ←Set.insert_eq, parts_insert_MPair, parts_insert_Hash]
-  rw[Set.insert_eq, Set.insert_eq, Set.insert_eq, Set.insert_eq, Set.insert_eq]
-  rw[Set.union_empty]; simp only [Set.union_assoc]
+  simp [HPair]; grind
 
 @[simp]
-lemma analz_insert_HPair {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma analz_insert_HPair [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   analz (insert (⦃X, Y⦄ₕ) H) = insert (⦃X, Y⦄ₕ) (insert (Hash ⦃X, Y⦄) (analz (insert Y H))) :=
   by simp [HPair]
 
 @[simp]
-lemma HPair_synth_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
+lemma HPair_synth_analz [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} :
   X ∉ synth (analz H) →
   ((⦃X, Y⦄ₕ ∈ synth (analz H)) ↔ (Hash ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ analz H ∧ Y ∈ synth (analz H))) :=
 by
-  intro _; simp [HPair]; intro _; constructor
+  intro _; simp [HPair, MPair_synth_analz]; intro _; constructor
   · intro h; cases h with
     | inj => assumption
     | hash a => cases a with
@@ -1312,7 +1354,7 @@ by
 
 -- We do NOT want Crypt... messages broken up in protocols!!
 -- TODO rewrite this
-attribute [-simp] parts.body
+-- attribute [-simp] parts.body
 
 -- Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can
 -- be pulled out using the `analz_insert` rules
@@ -1395,7 +1437,7 @@ by
   | body => aapply keyfree_CryptE
 
 -- The key-free part of a set of messages can be removed from the scope of the `analz` operator
-lemma analz_keyfree_into_Un {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma analz_keyfree_into_Un [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ analz (G ∪ H) → G ⊆ keyfree → X ∈ parts G ∪ analz H :=
 by
   intro hG hKeyFree
@@ -1434,12 +1476,12 @@ lemma Hash_notin_image_Key {X : Msg} {A : Set Key} : Hash X ∉ Key '' A :=
   by simp
 
 -- Monotonicity of `synth` over `analz`
-lemma synth_analz_mono {G H : Set Msg} : G ⊆ H → synth (analz G) ⊆ synth (analz H) :=
+lemma synth_analz_mono [InvKey] {G H : Set Msg} : G ⊆ H → synth (analz G) ⊆ synth (analz H) :=
   λ h => synth_mono (analz_mono h)
 
 -- Simplification for Fake cases
 @[simp]
-lemma Fake_analz_eq {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma Fake_analz_eq [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ synth (analz H) → synth (analz (insert X H)) = synth (analz H) :=
 by
   intro hX
@@ -1456,7 +1498,7 @@ by
   · apply synth_analz_mono; simp
 
 -- Generalizations of `analz_insert_eq`
-lemma gen_analz_insert_eq {H G : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma gen_analz_insert_eq [InvKey] {H G : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ analz H → H ⊆ G → analz (insert X G) = analz G :=
 by
   intro hX hSubset
@@ -1474,7 +1516,7 @@ by
   · intro h
     exact analz_mono (Set.subset_insert _ _) h
 
-lemma synth_analz_insert_eq {H G : Set Msg} {X : Msg} {K : Key} :
+lemma synth_analz_insert_eq [InvKey] {H G : Set Msg} {X : Msg} {K : Key} :
   X ∈ synth (analz H) → H ⊆ G → ((Key K ∈ analz (insert X G)) ↔ (Key K ∈ analz G)) :=
 by
   intro h₁ h₂
@@ -1504,7 +1546,7 @@ by
   
 
 -- Fake parts for single messages
-lemma Fake_parts_sing {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
+lemma Fake_parts_sing [InvKey] {H : Set Msg} {X : Msg} :
   X ∈ synth (analz H) → parts {X} ⊆ synth (analz H) ∪ parts H :=
 by
   intro h

InductiveVerification/NS_Public.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+import InductiveVerification.Public
+set_option diagnostics true
+
+-- The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
+namespace NS_Public
+
+variable [InvKey]
+variable [Bad]
+open Msg
+open Event
+open Bad
+open HasInitState
+open InvKey
+
+-- Define the inductive set `ns_public`
+inductive ns_public : List Event → Prop
+| Nil : ns_public []
+| Fake : ns_public evsf →
+    X ∈ synth (analz (spies evsf)) →
+    ns_public (Says Agent.Spy B X :: evsf)
+| NS1 : ns_public evs1 →
+    Nonce NA ∉ used evs1 →
+    ns_public (Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) :: evs1)
+| NS2 : ns_public evs2 →
+    Nonce NB ∉ used evs2 →
+    Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ evs2 →
+    ns_public (Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) :: evs2)
+| NS3 : ns_public evs3 →
+    Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ evs3 →
+    Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ evs3 →
+    ns_public (Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) :: evs3)
+
+-- A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end
+theorem possibility_property :
+  ∃ NB, ∃ evs, ns_public evs ∧ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ evs := by
+  exists 1
+  exists [ Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce 1)),
+           Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce 0, Nonce 1, Agent B⦄),
+           Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce 0, Agent A⦄),
+         ]
+  constructor
+  · apply ns_public.NS3
+    · apply ns_public.NS2
+      · apply_rules [ns_public.NS1, ns_public.Nil, Nonce_notin_used_empty]
+      · simp
+      · left
+    all_goals tauto
+  · simp
+
+-- Spy never sees another agent's private key unless it's bad at the start
+set_option trace.aesop true
+@[simp]
+theorem Spy_see_priEK {h : ns_public evs} :
+  (Key (priEK A) ∈ parts (spies evs)) ↔ A ∈ bad := by
+  constructor
+  -- · induction h <;> aesop (add norm spies, norm knows, norm initState, norm pubEK, norm priEK, norm pubSK, norm priSK, norm injective_publicKey)
+  · induction h with
+    | Nil => simp[spies, knows, initState]; intro h; cases h with
+             | inl h => cases h with
+               | inl => aesop (add norm pubEK, norm pubSK, safe forward injective_publicKey)
+               | inr h => simp[pubEK, priEK] at h; cases h with
+                | intro _ h => apply publicKey_neq_privateKey at h; contradiction
+             | inr h => simp[pubSK, priEK] at h; cases h with
+               | intro _ h => apply publicKey_neq_privateKey at h; contradiction
+    | Fake _ h ih => apply Fake_parts_sing at h
+                     simp[spies, knows]
+                     intro h₁; apply ih;
+                     cases h₁ with
+                      | inl h₁ => apply h at h₁; cases h₁ with 
+                        | inl h₁ => cases h₁; aapply analz_subset_parts
+                        | inr => assumption
+                      | inr => assumption
+    | NS1 _ _ ih => aesop (add norm spies, norm knows)
+    | NS2 _ _ _ ih => aesop (add norm spies, norm knows)
+    | NS3 _ _ _ ih => rw[spies, knows]; simp; intro _; apply ih; grind
+  · intro h₁; apply parts_increasing; aapply Spy_spies_bad_privateKey
+
+@[simp]
+theorem Spy_analz_priEK {h : ns_public evs} :
+  Key (priEK A) ∈ analz (spies evs) ↔ A ∈ bad := by
+  constructor
+  · intro h₁; apply analz_subset_parts at h₁; aapply Spy_see_priEK.mp
+  · intro h₁; apply analz_increasing; aapply Spy_spies_bad_privateKey
+
+-- Lammata for some very specific recurring cases in the following proof
+lemma no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper1
+{h : synth (analz (spies evsf)) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A⦄}
+: Nonce NA ∈ analz (knows Agent.Spy evsf) := by
+  cases h with
+  | inj => aapply analz.fst
+  | mpair n => cases n; assumption
+
+lemma no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper2
+{ih : Crypt (pubEK C) ⦃NA', ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent D⦄⦄ ∈ parts (spies evsf)
+  → Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evsf)
+  → Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evsf)}
+{h : parts {X} ⊆ synth (analz (spies evsf)) ∪ parts (spies evsf)}
+{h₁ : Crypt (pubEK C) ⦃NA', ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent D⦄⦄ ∈ parts (knows Agent.Spy evsf)}
+{h₂ : Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A⦄ ∈ parts {X} ∨
+      Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (knows Agent.Spy evsf)}
+: Nonce NA ∈ analz (knows Agent.Spy evsf) := by
+  apply ih at h₁; cases h₂ with
+  | inl h₂ => apply h at h₂; cases h₂ with
+    | inl h₂ => cases h₂ with
+      | inj => apply h₁; aapply analz_subset_parts
+      | crypt h₂ => aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper1
+    | inr => aapply h₁
+  | inr => aapply h₁
+
+-- It is impossible to re-use a nonce in both NS1 and NS2, provided the nonce is secret
+theorem no_nonce_NS1_NS2 { h : ns_public evs  } :
+  (Crypt (pubEK C) ⦃NA', Nonce NA, Agent D⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs) →
+  (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs) →
+  Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs))) := by
+  intro h₁ h₂
+  induction h with
+  | Nil => rw[spies, knows] at h₂; simp[initState] at h₂
+  | Fake _ h ih => 
+      apply Fake_parts_sing at h
+      simp[spies, knows] at h₁
+      apply analz_insert; right;
+      cases h₁ with 
+      | inl h₁ => simp_all; apply h at h₁; cases h₁ with
+        | inl h₁ => cases h₁ with
+          | inj h₁ => apply analz_subset_parts at h₁
+                      aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper2
+          | crypt h₁ => cases h₁ with
+            | inj => apply analz.fst; aapply analz.snd
+            | mpair _ h₁ => aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper1
+        | inr h₁ => aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper2
+      | inr h₁ => simp[spies, knows] at h₂; aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2_helper2
+  | NS1 =>
+    simp[spies] at h₁; simp[spies] at h₂; cases h₂ with
+    | inl h => rcases h with ⟨_ , ⟨n , _⟩⟩;
+               apply parts.body at h₁; apply parts.snd at h₁; apply parts.fst at h₁
+               apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used at h₁; rw[n] at h₁; contradiction
+    | inr => rw[spies, knows]; apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert; simp_all
+  | NS2 =>
+    simp[spies] at h₁; simp[spies] at h₂; cases h₁ with
+    | inl h => rcases h with ⟨_, ⟨_, ⟨n, _⟩⟩⟩
+               apply parts.body at h₂; apply parts.fst at h₂
+               apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used at h₂; rw[n] at h₂; contradiction
+    | inr => rw[spies, knows]; apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert; simp_all
+  | NS3 => rw[spies, knows]; apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert; simp_all
+
+lemma unique_NA_apply_ih {P : Prop}
+{a_ih : Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evsf)
+  → Crypt (pubEK B') ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A'⦄ ∈ parts (spies evsf)
+  → Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evsf) → P}
+{h₃ : Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies (Says Agent.Spy C X :: evsf))}
+{h₁ : Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evsf)}
+{h₂ : Crypt (pubEK B') ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A'⦄ ∈ parts (spies evsf)}
+: P := by
+  simp[spies, knows] at h₃; apply Set.notMem_subset at h₃
+  · aapply a_ih;
+  · apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert    
+
+lemma unique_NA_contradict
+{h₃ : Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies (Says Agent.Spy B X :: evsf))}
+{h₂ : synth (analz (spies evsf)) ⦃Nonce NA, Msg.Agent A'⦄}
+{P : Prop}
+: P := by
+  apply MPair_synth_analz.mp at h₂; rcases h₂ with ⟨⟨n⟩, m⟩;
+  simp[spies, knows] at h₃; apply Set.notMem_subset at h₃
+  · contradiction;
+  · apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert 
+
+-- Unicity for NS1: nonce NA identifies agents A and B
+theorem unique_NA { h : ns_public evs } :
+  (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs) →
+  (Crypt (pubEK B') ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A'⦄ ∈ parts (spies evs) →
+  (Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs) →
+  A = A' ∧ B = B'))) := by
+  induction h with
+  | Nil => aesop (add norm spies, norm knows, safe analz_insertI)
+  | Fake _ a a_ih =>
+    apply Fake_parts_sing at a; intro h₁ h₂ h₃;
+    simp[spies, knows] at h₁; cases h₁ with
+    | inl h₁ => apply a at h₁; cases h₁ with
+      | inl h₁ => cases h₁ with
+        | inj h₁ => simp[spies, knows] at h₂; cases h₂ with
+          | inl h₂ => apply a at h₂; cases h₂ with
+            | inl h₂ => cases h₂ with
+              | inj h₂ => apply analz_subset_parts at h₁
+                          apply analz_subset_parts at h₂
+                          aapply unique_NA_apply_ih   
+              | crypt h₂ => aapply unique_NA_contradict
+            | inr h₂ => apply analz_subset_parts at h₁
+                        aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+          | inr h₂ => apply analz_subset_parts at h₁
+                      aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+        | crypt h₁ => aapply unique_NA_contradict
+      | inr h₁ => simp[spies] at h₁; simp[spies, knows] at h₂; cases h₂ with
+        | inl h₂ => apply a at h₂; cases h₂ with
+          | inl h₂ => cases h₂ with
+            | inj h₂ => apply analz_subset_parts at h₂
+                        aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+            | crypt => aapply unique_NA_contradict
+          | inr => aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+        | inr => aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+    | inr => simp[spies, knows] at h₂; cases h₂ with
+      | inl h₂ => apply a at h₂; cases h₂ with
+        | inl h₂ => cases h₂ with
+          | inj h₂ => apply analz_subset_parts at h₂
+                      aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+          | crypt => aapply unique_NA_contradict
+        | inr => aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+      | inr => aapply unique_NA_apply_ih
+  | NS1 _ _ a_ih => intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp at h₁; cases h₁ with
+    | inl => sorry
+    | inr => simp at h₂; cases h₂ with
+      | inl h₂ => simp at h₃; rw[analz_Crypt] at h₃
+                  rcases h₂ with ⟨_, ⟨nonce_eq, _⟩⟩; rw[nonce_eq] at h₃; simp at h₃;
+      | inr => aapply unique_NA_apply_ih;
+  | NS2 => sorry
+  | NS3 => sorry
+
+-- Spy does not see the nonce sent in NS1 if A and B are secure
+theorem Spy_not_see_NA { h : ns_public evs  }:
+  Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ evs →
+  A ∉ bad →
+  B ∉ bad →
+  Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs) := by
+  intro h
+  induction h <;> simp_all [analz_insertI, no_nonce_NS1_NS2]
+
+-- If NS3 has been sent and the nonce NB agrees with the nonce B joined with NA, then A initiated the run using NA
+theorem B_trusts_protocol { h : ns_public evs  }:
+  A ∉ bad →
+  B ∉ bad →
+  Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) ∈ parts (spies evs) →
+  Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) ⦃Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B⦄) ∈ evs →
+  Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) ⦃Nonce NA, Agent A⦄) ∈ evs := by
+  intro h
+  induction h <;> simp_all [analz_insertI, no_nonce_NS1_NS2]
+
+end NS_Public

InductiveVerification/Public.lean

@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+import InductiveVerification.Event
+import Init.Data.Nat.Lemmas
+import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Basic
+import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Dist
+import Mathlib.Order.Defs.PartialOrder
+set_option diagnostics true
+
+-- Theory of Public Keys (common to all public-key protocols)
+
+-- Private and public keys; initial states of agents
+
+variable [InvKey]
+open InvKey
+
+lemma invKey_K {K : Key} : K ∈ symKeys → invKey K = K := by
+  intro h
+  simp [symKeys] at h
+  exact h
+
+-- Asymmetric Keys
+inductive KeyMode
+  | Signature
+  | Encryption
+
+axiom publicKey : KeyMode → Agent → Key
+axiom injective_publicKey : ∀ {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent},
+  publicKey b A = publicKey c A' → b = c ∧ A = A'
+
+noncomputable abbrev pubEK (A : Agent) : Key := publicKey KeyMode.Encryption A
+noncomputable abbrev pubSK (A : Agent) : Key := publicKey KeyMode.Signature A
+noncomputable abbrev privateKey (b : KeyMode) (A : Agent) : Key := invKey (publicKey b A)
+noncomputable abbrev priEK (A : Agent) : Key := privateKey KeyMode.Encryption A
+noncomputable abbrev priSK (A : Agent) : Key := privateKey KeyMode.Signature A
+noncomputable abbrev pubK (A : Agent) : Key := pubEK A
+noncomputable abbrev priK (A : Agent) : Key := invKey (pubEK A)
+
+-- Axioms for private and public keys
+axiom privateKey_neq_publicKey {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} :
+    privateKey b A ≠ publicKey c A'
+
+lemma publicKey_neq_privateKey {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} :
+    publicKey b A ≠ privateKey c A' := by
+  exact privateKey_neq_publicKey.symm
+
+-- Basic properties of pubK and priK
+omit [InvKey] in
+lemma publicKey_inject {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} :
+    (publicKey b A = publicKey c A') ↔ (b = c ∧ A = A') := by
+  grind[injective_publicKey]
+
+lemma invKey_injective: Function.Injective invKey := by
+  intro _ _ _
+  simp_all[invKey_eq]
+
+lemma not_symKeys_pubK {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} :
+    publicKey b A ∉ symKeys :=
+by
+  grind[symKeys, privateKey_neq_publicKey]
+
+lemma not_symKeys_priK {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} :
+    privateKey b A ∉ symKeys := by
+  simp [symKeys, privateKey, invKey_eq]; grind[privateKey_neq_publicKey];
+
+lemma syKey_neq_priEK :
+  K ∈ symKeys → K ≠ priEK A := by
+  intro _ _
+  have _ := not_symKeys_pubK (b := KeyMode.Encryption) (A := A)
+  simp_all[symKeys, invKey_eq]
+
+lemma symKeys_neq_imp_neq :
+  ((K ∈ symKeys) ≠ (K' ∈ symKeys)) → K ≠ K' := by
+  intro h eq
+  rw[eq] at h
+  contradiction
+
+@[simp]
+lemma symKeys_invKey_iff : (invKey K ∈ symKeys) = (K ∈ symKeys) := by
+  simp [symKeys, invKey_eq]
+
+lemma analz_symKeys_Decrypt :
+    Msg.Crypt K X ∈ analz H → K ∈ symKeys → Msg.Key K ∈ analz H → X ∈ analz H := by
+  simp [symKeys]
+  intro _ _ _
+  aapply analz.decrypt; simp_all
+
+-- "Image" equations that hold for injective functions
+
+@[simp]
+lemma invKey_image_eq : (invKey x ∈ invKey '' A) ↔ (x ∈ A) := by
+  simp [Set.mem_image]
+
+omit [InvKey] in
+@[simp]
+lemma publicKey_image_eq :
+    (publicKey b x ∈ publicKey c '' AA) ↔ (b = c ∧ x ∈ AA) := by
+  simp [Set.mem_image, publicKey_inject, And.comm, Eq.comm]
+
+@[simp]
+lemma privateKey_notin_image_publicKey :
+    privateKey b x ∉ publicKey c '' AA := by
+  simp[publicKey_neq_privateKey]
+
+@[simp]
+lemma privateKey_image_eq :
+    (privateKey b A ∈ invKey '' (publicKey c '' AS)) ↔ (b = c ∧ A ∈ AS) := by
+  rw[←publicKey_image_eq]; simp [Set.mem_image, privateKey]
+
+@[simp]
+lemma publicKey_notin_image_privateKey :
+    publicKey b A ∉ invKey '' ( publicKey c '' AS ) := by
+  simp [privateKey_neq_publicKey]
+ 
+-- Symmetric Keys
+-- For some protocols, it is convenient to equip agents with symmetric as
+-- well as asymmetric keys.  The theory ‹Shared› assumes that all keys
+-- are symmetric.
+axiom shrK : Agent → Key
+
+axiom inj_shrK : Function.Injective shrK
+
+-- All shared keys are symmetric
+axiom sym_shrK : ∀ {A : Agent}, shrK A ∈ symKeys 
+
+-- Injectiveness: Agents' long-term keys are distinct.
+@[simp]
+lemma invKey_shrK :
+    invKey (shrK A) = shrK A := by
+  simp [invKey_K, sym_shrK]
+  
+lemma analz_shrK_Decrypt :
+    Msg.Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz H → Msg.Key (shrK A) ∈ analz H → X ∈ analz H :=
+by
+  intro _ _
+  aapply analz.decrypt; rw[invKey_shrK]; assumption
+
+
+lemma analz_Decrypt' :
+    Msg.Crypt K X ∈ analz H → K ∈ symKeys → Msg.Key K ∈ analz H → X ∈ analz H := by
+  intro _ _ _
+  aapply analz.decrypt; simp_all[symKeys]
+
+@[simp]
+lemma priK_neq_shrK {A : Agent} : shrK A ≠ privateKey b C := by
+  intro h
+  apply not_symKeys_priK
+  rw[←h]
+  exact sym_shrK
+
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_neq_priK : privateKey b C ≠ shrK A := by
+  exact priK_neq_shrK.symm
+
+@[simp]
+lemma pubK_neq_shrK : shrK A ≠ publicKey b C := by
+  intro h
+  apply not_symKeys_pubK
+  rw[←h]
+  exact sym_shrK
+
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_neq_pubK : publicKey b C ≠ shrK A := by
+  exact pubK_neq_shrK.symm
+
+@[simp]
+lemma priEK_noteq_shrK : priEK A ≠ shrK B := by
+  simp
+
+@[simp]
+lemma publicKey_notin_image_shrK : publicKey b x ∉ shrK '' AA := by
+  simp
+
+@[simp]
+lemma privateKey_notin_image_shrK : privateKey b x ∉ shrK '' AA := by
+  simp
+
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_notin_image_publicKey : shrK x ∉ publicKey b '' AA := by
+  simp
+
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_notin_image_privateKey :
+  shrK x ∉ (invKey '' ((publicKey b) '' AA )) := by
+  simp
+
+omit [InvKey] in
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_image_eq : (shrK x ∈ shrK '' AA) ↔ (x ∈ AA) := by
+  grind[inj_shrK]
+
+attribute [simp] invKey_K
+
+variable [Bad]
+open Bad
+-- Fill in definition for Initial States of Agents
+@[simp]
+instance : HasInitState Agent where
+  initState
+    | Agent.Server =>
+      {Msg.Key (priEK Agent.Server), Msg.Key (priSK Agent.Server)} ∪
+      (Msg.Key '' Set.range pubEK) ∪ (Msg.Key '' Set.range pubSK) ∪ (Msg.Key '' Set.range shrK)
+    | Agent.Friend i =>
+      {Msg.Key (priEK (Agent.Friend i)), Msg.Key (priSK (Agent.Friend i)), Msg.Key (shrK (Agent.Friend i))} ∪
+      (Msg.Key '' Set.range pubEK) ∪ (Msg.Key '' Set.range pubSK)
+    | Agent.Spy =>
+      (Msg.Key '' (invKey '' (pubEK '' bad))) ∪ (Msg.Key '' ( invKey '' ( pubSK '' bad  ))) ∪
+      (Msg.Key '' ( shrK '' bad )) ∪
+      (Msg.Key '' Set.range pubEK) ∪ (Msg.Key '' Set.range pubSK)
+
+open HasInitState
+
+-- These lemmas allow reasoning about `used evs` rather than `knows Spy evs`,
+-- which is useful when there are private Notes. Because they depend upon the
+-- definition of `initState`, they cannot be moved up.
+
+lemma used_parts_subset_parts :
+  X ∈ used evs → ( parts {X} ⊆ used evs ) := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => 
+    simp[used]; intro A h₁ X h₂; simp; exists A
+    cases A
+    all_goals (
+      simp_all[-parts_union]
+      apply_rules [parts_trans, h₂, Set.singleton_subset_iff.mpr]
+    )
+  | cons e evs ih =>
+    intro h₁ X
+    cases e <;> simp[used] <;> simp[used] at h₁ <;> try aapply ih;
+    all_goals (
+    cases h₁ with
+      | inl h₁ => intro _; left; apply_rules [parts_trans, h₁, Set.singleton_subset_iff.mpr]
+      | inr h₁ => intro h₂; right; apply ih at h₁; aapply h₁
+    )
+
+lemma MPair_used_D :
+    ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ used evs → (X ∈ used evs ∧ Y ∈ used evs) := by
+  intro h
+  apply used_parts_subset_parts (X := Msg.MPair X Y) (evs := evs) at h
+  rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_MPair] at h
+  simp at h
+  apply And.intro <;> apply h <;> tauto
+
+lemma MPair_used {P : Prop} :
+    ⦃X, Y⦄ ∈ used evs →
+    (X ∈ used evs → Y ∈ used evs → P) →
+    P := by
+  intro hXY hP
+  have ⟨hX, hY⟩ := MPair_used_D hXY
+  exact hP hX hY
+
+-- Define `@[simp]` lemmas for `initState` for each case of `Agent`
+@[simp]
+lemma keysFor_parts_initState {C : Agent} :
+    keysFor (parts (initState C)) = ∅ := by
+  cases C <;>
+  simp[initState, keysFor] <;>
+  repeat rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty] <;>
+  simp
+
+lemma Crypt_notin_initState {B : Agent} :
+  Msg.Crypt K X ∉ parts ( initState B ) := by
+  cases B <;> simp[initState, priEK, priSK, shrK] <;>
+  apply And.intro <;> try apply And.intro
+  all_goals repeat rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty] <;>
+  simp
+
+@[simp]
+lemma Crypt_notin_used_empty :
+  Msg.Crypt K X ∉ used [] := by
+  simp[used]; intro A; cases A <;> simp <;> apply And.intro <;> try apply And.intro
+  all_goals (rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty] ; simp)
+
+-- Basic properties of shrK
+
+-- Agents see their own shared keys
+-- iff
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_in_initState {A : Agent} :
+    Msg.Key (shrK A) ∈ initState A := by
+  induction A <;> simp [HasInitState.initState, initState]
+  exists Agent.Spy; simp[Spy_in_bad]
+
+-- iff
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_in_knows {A : Agent} : Msg.Key (shrK A) ∈ knows A evs := by
+  apply initState_subset_knows
+  exact shrK_in_initState
+
+-- iff
+@[simp]
+lemma shrK_in_used {A : Agent} : Msg.Key (shrK A) ∈ used evs := by
+  apply_rules [initState_into_used, parts.inj, shrK_in_initState]
+
+-- Fresh keys never clash with long-term shared keys
+
+-- Used in parts_induct_tac and analz_Fake_tac to distinguish session keys
+-- from long-term shared keys
+@[simp]
+lemma Key_not_used {K : Key} : Msg.Key K ∉ used evs → K ∉ Set.range shrK := by
+  simp
+  intro h₁ _ h₂
+  apply h₁
+  rw[←h₂]
+  apply shrK_in_used
+
+lemma shrK_neq {K : Key} {B : Agent} : Msg.Key K ∉ used evs → shrK B ≠ K := by
+  intro h h'
+  apply h
+  rw [←h']
+  exact shrK_in_used
+
+@[simp]
+lemma neq_shrK {K : Key} {B : Agent} : Msg.Key K ∉ used evs → K ≠ shrK B := by
+  intro h; apply shrK_neq at h; exact h.symm
+
+-- Function spies
+
+omit [InvKey] [Bad] in
+lemma not_SignatureE {b : KeyMode} : b ≠ KeyMode.Signature → b = KeyMode.Encryption := by
+  cases b <;> simp
+  
+-- Agents see their own private keys
+@[simp]
+lemma priK_in_initState {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} :
+    Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ initState A := by
+  induction A <;>
+  simp [HasInitState.initState, initState, privateKey, pubEK, pubSK] <;>
+  cases b <;>
+  try simp
+  · left; left; right; exists Agent.Spy; apply And.intro; exact Spy_in_bad; rfl
+  · left; left; left; exists Agent.Spy; apply And.intro; exact Spy_in_bad; rfl
+
+@[simp]
+lemma publicKey_in_initState {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} {B : Agent} :
+    Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ initState B := by
+  induction B <;>
+  simp [HasInitState.initState, initState, priEK, priSK, pubEK, pubSK] <;>
+  cases b <;>
+  simp
+  
+-- All public keys are visible
+@[simp]
+lemma spies_pubK : Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ spies evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [spies, knows]
+           cases b
+           · right; exists A
+           · left; right; exists A
+  | cons e evs ih =>
+    cases e <;> rw [spies] <;> apply knows_subset_knows_Cons <;> assumption
+
+@[simp]
+lemma analz_spies_pubK : Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ analz (spies evs) := by
+  exact analz.inj spies_pubK
+
+-- Spy sees private keys of bad agents
+lemma Spy_spies_bad_privateKey { h : A ∈ bad } : Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ spies evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [spies, knows, pubSK, pubEK]; left; left
+           cases b
+           · right; exists A
+           · left; exists A
+  | cons e evs ih =>
+    cases e <;> rw[spies] <;> aapply knows_subset_knows_Cons
+
+-- Spy sees long-term shared keys of bad agents
+lemma Spy_spies_bad_shrK {h : A ∈ bad} : Msg.Key (shrK A) ∈ spies evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil => simp [spies, knows]; exists A
+  | cons e evs ih =>
+    cases e <;> rw [spies] <;> aapply knows_subset_knows_Cons
+
+@[simp]
+lemma publicKey_into_used : Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ used evs := by
+  aapply initState_into_used
+  apply parts_increasing
+  exact publicKey_in_initState
+
+@[simp]
+lemma privateKey_into_used : Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ used evs := by
+  aapply initState_into_used
+  apply parts_increasing
+  exact priK_in_initState
+
+-- For case analysis on whether or not an agent is compromised
+lemma Crypt_Spy_analz_bad :
+    Msg.Crypt (shrK A) X ∈ analz (knows Agent.Spy evs) → A ∈ bad → X ∈ analz (knows Agent.Spy evs) := by
+    intro h₁ h₂
+    aapply analz.decrypt
+    apply analz_increasing
+    simp[invKey_shrK]
+    aapply Spy_spies_bad_shrK
+
+@[simp]
+lemma Nonce_notin_initState {B : Agent} : Msg.Nonce N ∉ parts (initState B) := by
+  cases B <;>
+  simp [initState] <;> apply And.intro <;> try (apply And.intro)
+  all_goals (rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty]; simp)
+
+@[simp]
+lemma Nonce_notin_used_empty : Msg.Nonce N ∉ used [] := by
+  simp [used]; intro A; cases A <;> simp <;>
+  apply And.intro <;> try (apply And.intro)
+  all_goals (rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty]; simp)
+
+-- Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems
+lemma Nonce_supply_lemma : ∃ N, ∀ n, N ≤ n → Msg.Nonce n ∉ used evs := by
+  induction evs with
+  | nil =>
+    use 0; simp
+  | cons e evs ih =>
+    obtain ⟨N₁, hN⟩ := ih
+    cases e with
+    | Says _ _ m => simp[used]
+                    have ns := msg_Nonce_supply (msg := m)
+                    obtain ⟨N₂, ns⟩ := ns
+                    exists Nat.max N₁ N₂
+                    simp_all
+    | Notes _ m => simp[used]
+                   have ns := msg_Nonce_supply (msg := m)
+                   obtain ⟨N₂, ns⟩ := ns
+                   exists Nat.max N₁ N₂
+                   simp_all
+    | Gets => simp[used]; exists N₁
+
+
+lemma Nonce_supply1 : ∃ N, Msg.Nonce N ∉ used evs := by
+  obtain ⟨N, h⟩ := Nonce_supply_lemma
+  exact ⟨N, h N (le_refl N)⟩
+
+-- TODO is this really needed?
+-- lemma Nonce_supply : Msg.Nonce (Classical.some (Nonce_supply_lemma.some_spec)) ∉ used evs := by
+--   obtain ⟨N, h⟩ := Nonce_supply_lemma
+--   exact h (Classical.some (Nonce_supply_lemma.some_spec)) (le_refl _)
+
+-- Specialized Rewriting for Theorems About `analz` and Image
+omit [InvKey] [Bad] in
+lemma insert_Key_singleton : insert (Msg.Key K) H = Msg.Key '' {K} ∪ H := by
+  simp
+
+omit [InvKey] [Bad] in
+@[simp]
+lemma insert_Key_image : insert (Msg.Key K) (Msg.Key '' KK ∪ C) = Msg.Key '' (insert K KK) ∪ C := by
+  rw[insert_Key_singleton, Set.image_insert_eq, Set.insert_eq, Set.union_assoc, Set.image_singleton]
+
+omit [Bad] in
+lemma Crypt_imp_keysFor :
+    Msg.Crypt K X ∈ H → K ∈ symKeys → K ∈ keysFor H := by
+  intro h₁ h₂
+  apply invKey_K at h₂
+  rw[←h₂]
+  aapply Crypt_imp_invKey_keysFor
+
+-- Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if of the 
+-- Session Key Compromise Theorem
+omit [Bad] in
+@[simp]
+lemma analz_image_freshK_lemma :
+    ((Msg.Key K ∈ analz (Msg.Key '' nE ∪ H)) →
+    (K ∈ nE ∨ Msg.Key K ∈ analz H)) →
+    (Msg.Key K ∈ analz (Msg.Key '' nE ∪ H)) = (K ∈ nE ∨ Msg.Key K ∈ analz H) :=
+by
+  intro h
+  ext; constructor; assumption;
+  intro h₁; simp_all; cases h₁
+  · apply analz_increasing; left; simp; assumption
+  · apply analz_union; right; assumption

Main.lean

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import InductiveVerification
+-- import InductiveVerification
+import InductiveVerification.Public
 
 def main : IO Unit :=
   IO.println "Hello, world!"

lake-manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+{"version": "1.1.0",
+ "packagesDir": ".lake/packages",
+ "packages":
+ [{"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/mathlib4.git",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "",
+   "rev": "95093e961c9b2e15366b2232d2b95f6688e9e082",
+   "name": "mathlib",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": null,
+   "inherited": false,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.lean"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/plausible",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
+   "rev": "b3dd6c3ebc0a71685e86bea9223be39ea4c299fb",
+   "name": "plausible",
+   "manifestFile": "lake-manifest.json",
+   "inputRev": "main",
+   "inherited": true,
+   "configFile": "lakefile.toml"},
+  {"url": "https://github.com/leanprover-community/LeanSearchClient",
+   "type": "git",
+   "subDir": null,
+   "scope": "leanprover-community",
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