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Added expand_parts_element macro
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Further simplified proofs in NS_public
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Your Name
2026-03-04 18:44:21 +01:00
parent 7367681bc6
commit 58c093b18d
3 changed files with 176 additions and 229 deletions
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InductiveVerification/Message.lean
+33
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import Init.Data.Nat.Lemmas import Init.Data.Nat.Lemmas
import Init.Prelude import Init.Prelude
import Lean
import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Basic import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Basic
import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Dist import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Dist
import Mathlib.Data.Set.Basic import Mathlib.Data.Set.Basic
@@ -12,6 +13,8 @@ import Mathlib.Order.Lattice
import Mathlib.Tactic.ApplyAt import Mathlib.Tactic.ApplyAt
import Mathlib.Tactic.SimpIntro import Mathlib.Tactic.SimpIntro
import Mathlib.Tactic.NthRewrite import Mathlib.Tactic.NthRewrite
open Lean Elab Command Term Meta
open Parser.Tactic
-- Keys are integers -- Keys are integers
abbrev Key := Nat abbrev Key := Nat
@@ -351,6 +354,14 @@ lemma parts_element:
· intro h; apply_rules [ parts_subset_iff.mp, Set.singleton_subset_iff.mpr ] · intro h; apply_rules [ parts_subset_iff.mp, Set.singleton_subset_iff.mpr ]
· intro h; aapply parts_subset_iff.mpr; simp · intro h; aapply parts_subset_iff.mpr; simp
/--
A tactic that expands terms like `X ∈ parts H`
-/
syntax (name := expandPartsElement) "expand_parts_element" (ppSpace location) : tactic
macro_rules
| `(tactic| expand_parts_element at $loc) =>
`(tactic| rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at $loc; simp at $loc)
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma parts_insert_Agent {H : Set Msg} {agt : Agent} : lemma parts_insert_Agent {H : Set Msg} {agt : Agent} :
parts (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (parts H) := parts (insert (Agent agt) H) = insert (Agent agt) (parts H) :=
@@ -593,6 +604,16 @@ by
| snd h ih => exact analz.snd ih | snd h ih => exact analz.snd ih
| decrypt h₁ h₂ ih₁ ih₂ => exact analz.decrypt ih₁ ih₂ | decrypt h₁ h₂ ih₁ ih₂ => exact analz.decrypt ih₁ ih₂
lemma analz_mono_neg [InvKey] { h : A ⊆ B } :
X ∉ analz B → X ∉ analz A
:= by
intro h₁ h₂; apply h₁; aapply analz_mono;
lemma analz_insert_mono_neg [InvKey] :
X ∉ analz (insert Y H) → X ∉ analz H
:= by
apply_rules [ analz_mono_neg, Set.subset_insert ]
-- Making it safe speeds up proofs -- Making it safe speeds up proofs
-- @[simp] -- @[simp]
lemma MPair_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} {P : Prop} [InvKey] : lemma MPair_analz {H : Set Msg} {X Y : Msg} {P : Prop} [InvKey] :
@@ -1597,3 +1618,15 @@ by
apply subset_trans (b := parts (insert X H)) apply subset_trans (b := parts (insert X H))
· apply parts_mono; simp · apply parts_mono; simp
· aapply Fake_parts_insert · aapply Fake_parts_insert
-- Often the result of Fake_parts_sing needs to be applied to a term in a
-- disjunction
lemma Fake_parts_sing_helper {A B : Set Msg}
{ h : A ⊆ B } :
X ∈ A ∨ h₁ → X ∈ B ∨ h₁
:= by
intro h; cases h <;> try simp_all
left; aapply h
attribute [-simp] Key.injEq
InductiveVerification/NS_Public.lean
+117 -188
View File
@@ -46,15 +46,6 @@ theorem possibility_property :
all_goals tauto all_goals tauto
· simp · simp
-- Lemmata for some very specific recurring cases in the following proof
omit [InvKey] [Bad] in
lemma Fake_parts_sing_helper {A B : Set Msg}
{ h : A ⊆ B } :
X ∈ A ∨ h₁ → X ∈ B ∨ h₁
:= by
intro h; cases h <;> try simp_all
left; aapply h
-- Spy never sees another agent's private key unless it's bad at the start -- Spy never sees another agent's private key unless it's bad at the start
@[simp] @[simp]
theorem Spy_see_priEK {h : ns_public evs} : theorem Spy_see_priEK {h : ns_public evs} :
@@ -62,17 +53,14 @@ theorem Spy_see_priEK {h : ns_public evs} :
constructor constructor
· induction h with · induction h with
| Nil => | Nil =>
simp[spies, knows, initState, pubEK, priEK, pubSK]; intro h simp[spies, knows, initState, pubEK, priEK, pubSK]
rcases h with (((⟨B, bad, h⟩ | ⟨B, bad, h⟩) | ⟨B, h⟩) | ⟨B, h⟩) <;>
try (apply injective_publicKey at h; simp_all)
all_goals (apply publicKey_neq_privateKey at h; contradiction)
| Fake _ h ih => | Fake _ h ih =>
apply Fake_parts_sing at h apply Fake_parts_sing at h
intro h₁; simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := h) at h₁ intro h₁; simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := h) at h₁
simp at h₁; aapply ih; simp_all
| NS1 _ _ ih => simp; assumption | NS1 => simp_all
| NS2 _ _ _ ih => simp; assumption | NS2 => simp_all
| NS3 _ _ _ ih => simp; assumption | NS3 => simp_all
· intro h₁; apply parts_increasing; aapply Spy_spies_bad_privateKey · intro h₁; apply parts_increasing; aapply Spy_spies_bad_privateKey
@[simp] @[simp]
@@ -89,41 +77,29 @@ theorem no_nonce_NS1_NS2 { evs: List Event} { h : ns_public evs } :
Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs))) := by Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs))) := by
intro h₁ h₂ intro h₁ h₂
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => rw[spies, knows] at h₂; simp[initState] at h₂ | Nil => simp[spies, knows] at h₂
| Fake _ h ih => | Fake _ h ih =>
simp; apply analz_insert; right simp; apply analz_insert;
apply Fake_parts_sing at h apply Fake_parts_sing at h
simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := h) at h₁; simp at h₁ simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := h) at h₁; simp at h₁
simp at h₂; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := h) at h₂; simp at h₂ simp at h₂; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := h) at h₂; simp at h₂
rcases h₁ with ((_ | _) | _) <;> rcases h₁ with ((_ | _) | _) <;>
rcases h₂ with ((_ | _) | _) <;> rcases h₂ with ((_ | _) | _) <;>
try simp_all simp_all
all_goals (aapply ih <;> aapply analz_subset_parts) all_goals (right; aapply ih <;> aapply analz_subset_parts)
| NS1 _ nonce_not_used => | NS1 _ nonce_not_used =>
apply analz_spies_mono
simp [*] at *
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used; apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used;
simp[spies] at h₁; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp at h₁; expand_parts_element at h₁; expand_parts_element at h₂;
simp[spies] at h₂; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂;
apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert
cases h₂ <;> simp_all cases h₂ <;> simp_all
| NS2 _ nonce_not_used => | NS2 _ nonce_not_used =>
apply analz_spies_mono
simp [*] at *
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used; apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used;
simp[spies] at h₁; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp at h₁; expand_parts_element at h₂;
simp[spies] at h₂; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂; cases h₁ <;> simp_all[-Key.injEq]
apply analz_mono; apply Set.subset_insert | NS3 _ _ _ a_ih => apply analz_spies_mono; simp_all
cases h₁ <;> simp_all
| NS3 _ _ _ a_ih => simp at h₁; simp at h₂; apply analz_mono
apply Set.subset_insert; aapply a_ih
@[simp]
lemma injective_pubEK_helper:
( pubEK A = pubEK B ∧ h) ↔ ( A = B ∧ h )
:= by
constructor
· intro h₁
rcases h₁ with ⟨e, _⟩
apply injective_publicKey at e
aapply And.intro; simp_all
· intro h₁; simp_all
-- Unicity for NS1: nonce NA identifies agents A and B -- Unicity for NS1: nonce NA identifies agents A and B
theorem unique_NA { h : ns_public evs } : theorem unique_NA { h : ns_public evs } :
@@ -132,36 +108,24 @@ theorem unique_NA { h : ns_public evs } :
(Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs) → (Nonce NA ∉ analz (spies evs) →
A = A' ∧ B = B'))) := by A = A' ∧ B = B'))) := by
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => aesop (add norm spies, norm knows, safe analz_insertI) | Nil => simp[spies, knows]
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
apply Fake_parts_sing at a; intro h₁ h₂ h₃; apply Fake_parts_sing at a; intro h₁ h₂ h₃;
simp[spies, knows] at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁ apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₃;
simp at h₁ simp [*] at *
simp[spies, knows] at h₂; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂ apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁
simp at h₂ apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂
simp[spies, knows] at h₃; simp_all
rcases h₁ with ((_ | _) | _) <;>
rcases h₂ with ((_ | _) | _) <;>
try (
apply False.elim; apply h₃; apply analz_mono; aapply Set.subset_insert
tauto
)
all_goals (aapply a_ih <;> try aapply analz_subset_parts
all_goals (
intro _; apply h₃; aapply analz_mono; aapply Set.subset_insert
))
| NS1 _ nonce_not_used a_ih => | NS1 _ nonce_not_used a_ih =>
intro h₁ h₂ h₃ intro h₁ h₂ h₃
simp at h₁; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp at h₁ apply analz_insert_mono_neg at h₃
simp at h₂; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂ simp [*] at *
expand_parts_element at h₁
expand_parts_element at h₂
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used
cases h₁ <;> cases h₂ <;> simp_all cases h₁ <;> cases h₂ <;> simp_all
aapply a_ih; intro h; apply h₃; apply_rules[analz_mono, Set.subset_insert] | NS2 => intro _ _ h₃; apply analz_insert_mono_neg at h₃; simp_all
| NS2 _ _ _ a_ih => intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp_all; apply a_ih; intro h; apply h₃ | NS3 => intro _ _ h₃; apply analz_insert_mono_neg at h₃; simp_all;
apply_rules [analz_mono, Set.subset_insert]
| NS3 _ _ _ a_ih => intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp at h₁; simp at h₂; aapply a_ih
intro h; apply h₃
apply_rules [analz_mono, Set.subset_insert]
-- Spy does not see the nonce sent in NS1 if A and B are secure -- Spy does not see the nonce sent in NS1 if A and B are secure
theorem Spy_not_see_NA { h : ns_public evs } theorem Spy_not_see_NA { h : ns_public evs }
@@ -172,7 +136,7 @@ theorem Spy_not_see_NA { h : ns_public evs }
intro h₁ h₄ intro h₁ h₄
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => simp_all | Nil => simp_all
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a =>
have _ := Spy_in_bad; apply Fake_analz_insert at a; apply a at h₄; simp_all have _ := Spy_in_bad; apply Fake_analz_insert at a; apply a at h₄; simp_all
| NS1 _ a a_ih => simp_all; cases h₁ with | NS1 _ a a_ih => simp_all; cases h₁ with
| inl => simp_all; apply a; aapply analz_knows_Spy_subset_used | inl => simp_all; apply a; aapply analz_knows_Spy_subset_used
@@ -181,36 +145,26 @@ theorem Spy_not_see_NA { h : ns_public evs }
apply used_parts_subset_parts at h; apply a; apply h; simp apply used_parts_subset_parts at h; apply a; apply h; simp
· aapply a_ih · aapply a_ih
| NS2 _ not_used_NB a a_ih => | NS2 _ not_used_NB a a_ih =>
cases h₁ with | tail _ b => simp at h₁
have _ := h₄ have _ := h₄
simp at h₄; apply analz_insert_Crypt_subset at h₄ simp at h₄; apply analz_insert_Crypt_subset at h₄
simp at h₄; rcases h₄ with ( h | h | h) simp at h₄; rcases h₄ with ( h | h | h)
· simp at a_ih; have c := b; apply a_ih at c; rw[h] at b; · simp [*] at *; have c := h₁; apply a_ih at c;
have _ := c; rw[h] at c; have _ := c;
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at b apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a
apply unique_NA at b; apply b at a; apply a at c; simp_all apply unique_NA at h₁; apply h₁ at a; apply a at c; all_goals simp_all
assumption · simp_all
· rw [h] at b apply not_used_NB; apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used; apply parts.fst;
apply not_used_NB; apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used; apply parts.fst; apply parts.body; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy; assumption
apply parts.body; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy; assumption · aapply a_ih
· aapply a_ih | NS3 _ _ a₂ a_ih =>
| NS3 _ a₁ a₂ a_ih => simp [*] at *
cases h₁ with | tail _ b => have _ := h₄
have _ := h₄ apply analz_insert_Crypt_subset at h₄; simp[*] at h₄;
simp at h₄; apply analz_insert_Crypt_subset at h₄ have _ := h₁; simp[*] at h₁; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁
simp at h₄; rcases h₄ with ( h | h | h) apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a₂
· have _ := b; have _ := a₁; have _ := a₂ aapply a_ih; apply no_nonce_NS1_NS2 <;> try simp [*] <;> assumption
rw[h] at b; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at b
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a₂
aapply a_ih; apply no_nonce_NS1_NS2
· assumption
· rw[h]; exact a₂
· rw[h]; exact b
· aapply a_ih; aapply analz.inj
· aapply a_ih; aapply analz.fst
· aapply a_ih; aapply analz.snd
· aapply a_ih; aapply analz.decrypt
-- Authentication for `A`: if she receives message 2 and has used `NA` to start a run, then `B` has sent message 2. -- Authentication for `A`: if she receives message 2 and has used `NA` to start a run, then `B` has sent message 2.
theorem A_trusts_NS2 {h : ns_public evs } theorem A_trusts_NS2 {h : ns_public evs }
@@ -227,33 +181,26 @@ theorem A_trusts_NS2 {h : ns_public evs }
| Nil => simp_all | Nil => simp_all
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
have snsNA := h₁; apply Spy_not_see_NA at snsNA <;> try assumption have snsNA := h₁; apply Spy_not_see_NA at snsNA <;> try assumption
simp at h₁; simp at h₂; apply analz_spies_mono_neg at snsNA
simp [*] at *
cases h₁ cases h₁
· have _ := Spy_in_bad; simp_all · have _ := Spy_in_bad; simp_all
· right; apply Fake_parts_sing at a; · apply Fake_parts_sing at a;
apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂; simp at h₂ apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂; simp at h₂
rcases h₂ with ((_ | _) | _) <;> aapply a_ih rcases h₂ with ((_ | _) | _) <;> (right; aapply a_ih)
· aapply analz_subset_parts · aapply analz_subset_parts
· apply False.elim; apply snsNA; apply analz_spies_mono; tauto; · tauto
· aapply ns_public.Fake · aapply ns_public.Fake
| NS1 _ a a_ih => right; simp at h₂; cases h₁ | NS1 _ a a_ih =>
· apply False.elim; apply a apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at a;
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used; apply parts.fst simp [*] at *; expand_parts_element at h₂; cases h₁ <;> simp_all
aapply parts.body
· aapply a_ih;
| NS2 _ _ a a_ih => | NS2 _ _ a a_ih =>
simp at h₁; have b := h₁; have snsNA := h₁ simp [*] at *
apply Spy_not_see_NA at snsNA <;> try assumption have snsNA := h₁; apply Spy_not_see_NA at snsNA <;> try assumption
simp at h₂; rcases h₂ with (⟨_ , e₂ , _, e₄⟩ | _) cases h₂ <;> simp_all
· apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a; apply unique_NA at a;
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at b apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁; apply a at h₁; all_goals simp_all
apply unique_NA at a | NS3 _ _ a a_ih => simp_all;
rw[e₂] at b; rw[e₂] at snsNA
apply a at b
apply b at snsNA
simp_all[-e₄]; assumption
· right; aapply a_ih
| NS3 _ _ a a_ih => simp at h₁; simp at h₂; right; aapply a_ih
-- If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in `NS1` -- If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in `NS1`
lemma B_trusts_NS1 { h : ns_public evs} : lemma B_trusts_NS1 { h : ns_public evs} :
@@ -263,19 +210,15 @@ lemma B_trusts_NS1 { h : ns_public evs} :
:= by := by
intro h₁ h₂ intro h₁ h₂
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => simp[spies] at h₁; rw[knows] at h₁; simp[initState] at h₁ | Nil => simp[spies, knows] at h₁
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₂
simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing at a; simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing at a;
apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁; simp at h₁ apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁; simp_all
rcases h₁ with ((h₁ | h₁ )| h₁); | NS1 _ _ a_ih =>
· right; aapply a_ih; aapply analz_subset_parts; aapply analz_spies_mono_neg apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₂; simp_all; cases h₁ <;> simp_all
· apply False.elim; apply h₂; apply analz_spies_mono; simp_all | NS2 _ _ _ a_ih => apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₂; simp_all;
· right; aapply a_ih; aapply analz_spies_mono_neg | NS3 _ _ _ a_ih => apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₂; simp_all;
| NS1 _ _ a_ih => simp at h₁; cases h₁
· simp_all
· right; aapply a_ih; aapply analz_spies_mono_neg
| NS2 _ _ _ a_ih => simp at h₁; right; aapply a_ih; aapply analz_spies_mono_neg
| NS3 _ _ _ a_ih => simp at h₁; right; aapply a_ih; aapply analz_spies_mono_neg
-- Authenticity Properties obtained from `NS2` -- Authenticity Properties obtained from `NS2`
@@ -289,31 +232,26 @@ theorem unique_NB { h : ns_public evs } :
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => aesop (add norm spies, norm knows, safe analz_insertI) | Nil => aesop (add norm spies, norm knows, safe analz_insertI)
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
intro h₁ h₂ h₃; apply Fake_parts_sing at a; intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp [*] at *
apply Fake_parts_sing at a apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁;
simp[spies, knows] at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁ apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂; simp [*] at *
simp at h₁; apply analz_insert_mono_neg at h₃
simp at h₂; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂; simp at h₂; rcases h₁ with ((_ | _) | _) <;>
apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₃ rcases h₂ with ((_ | _) | _) <;>
rcases h₁ with ((h₁ | h₁) | h₁) <;>
rcases h₂ with ((h₂ | h₂) | h₂) <;>
simp_all simp_all
all_goals (aapply a_ih; repeat aapply analz_subset_parts) all_goals (aapply a_ih; repeat aapply analz_subset_parts)
| NS1 _ _ a_ih => intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp at h₁; simp at h₂; aapply a_ih | NS1 _ _ a_ih => intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp at h₁; simp at h₂; aapply a_ih
aapply analz_spies_mono_neg aapply analz_spies_mono_neg
| NS2 _ nonce_not_used _ a_ih => | NS2 _ nonce_not_used _ a_ih =>
intro h₁ h₂ h₃; intro h₁ h₂ h₃; simp [*] at *
-- This is how to rewrite `M ∈ parts` terms into something useful expand_parts_element at h₁
-- TODO create a macro for this expand_parts_element at h₂
-- TODO this should work with analz as well apply analz_insert_mono_neg at h₃;
simp at h₁; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp at h₁
simp at h₂; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂
apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₃;
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used
rcases h₁ with (_ | h₁) <;> rcases h₁ with (_ | h₁) <;>
rcases h₂ with (_ | h₂) <;> simp_all rcases h₂ with (_ | h₂) <;> simp_all
| NS3 _ _ _ a_ih => | NS3 _ _ _ a_ih =>
intro h₁ h₂ h₃; apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₃; simp_all; intro h₁ h₂ h₃; apply analz_spies_mono_neg at h₃; simp_all[-Key.injEq]
-- `NB` remains secret -- `NB` remains secret
theorem Spy_not_see_NB { h : ns_public evs } theorem Spy_not_see_NB { h : ns_public evs }
@@ -328,16 +266,13 @@ theorem Spy_not_see_NB { h : ns_public evs }
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
have _ := Spy_in_bad; apply Fake_analz_insert at a; apply a at h₄; simp_all; have _ := Spy_in_bad; apply Fake_analz_insert at a; apply a at h₄; simp_all;
| NS1 _ nonce_not_used a_ih => | NS1 _ nonce_not_used a_ih =>
simp at h₁ simp [*] at *
simp[spies, knows] at h₄; apply analz_insert_Crypt_subset at h₄; simp at h₄ apply analz_insert_Crypt_subset at h₄; simp at h₄
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used
cases h₄ with have h₂ := h₁; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₂
| inl e => apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁; expand_parts_element at h₂; simp_all
rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp_all
| inr => aapply a_ih
| NS2 _ not_used_NB a a_ih => | NS2 _ not_used_NB a a_ih =>
simp at h₁; simp [*] at *
simp[spies, knows] at h₄;
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at not_used_NB apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at not_used_NB
rcases h₁ with (_ | h₁) rcases h₁ with (_ | h₁)
· simp_all; apply not_used_NB; aapply analz_subset_parts · simp_all; apply not_used_NB; aapply analz_subset_parts
@@ -345,7 +280,7 @@ theorem Spy_not_see_NB { h : ns_public evs }
· aapply a_ih; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a; · aapply a_ih; apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a;
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁; simp_all; aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2 apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁; simp_all; aapply no_nonce_NS1_NS2
· apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁; · apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁;
rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp_all expand_parts_element at h₁; simp_all
· aapply a_ih · aapply a_ih
| NS3 _ _ a a_ih => | NS3 _ _ a a_ih =>
simp at h₁; simp[analz_insert_Crypt_element] at h₄; simp at h₁; simp[analz_insert_Crypt_element] at h₄;
@@ -367,31 +302,27 @@ theorem B_trusts_NS3 { h : ns_public evs }
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => simp_all | Nil => simp_all
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
right; simp at h₁ simp [*] at *
apply Fake_parts_sing at a apply Fake_parts_sing at a
simp at h₂; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂; simp at h₂ apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₂; simp at h₂
rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂ expand_parts_element at h₂;
have _ := Spy_in_bad rcases h₁ with (_ | h₁) <;>
rcases h₁ with (h₁ | h₁) <;> rcases h₂ with ((h₂ | h₂) | h₂) <;> simp_all rcases h₂ with ((h₂ | _) | _) <;> simp_all[Spy_in_bad]
· aapply a_ih; aapply analz_subset_parts · apply analz_subset_parts at h₂; simp_all
· apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₁ <;> simp_all · apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₁ <;> simp_all
· aapply a_ih | NS1 => simp_all
| NS1 _ a a_ih => right; simp at h₂; simp at h₁; aapply a_ih; | NS2 _ nonce_not_used =>
| NS2 _ nonce_not_used a a_ih => simp [*] at *
right
apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used; apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used;
simp at h₂; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂ expand_parts_element at h₂; cases h₁ <;> simp_all
simp at h₁; cases h₁ <;> simp_all; aapply a_ih | NS3 _ _ a₂ =>
| NS3 _ _ a₂ a_ih => simp [*] at *;
simp at h₁ expand_parts_element at h₂; cases h₂ <;> simp_all
simp at h₂; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₂; simp at h₂
cases h₂ <;> simp_all
have h₁c := h₁ have h₁c := h₁
apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₁c apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₁c
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁ apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at h₁; apply unique_NB at h₁;
apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a₂ apply Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy at a₂; apply h₁ at a₂
apply unique_NB at h₁; apply h₁ at a₂ all_goals simp_all
apply a₂ at h₁c; all_goals simp_all
-- Overall guarantee for `B` -- Overall guarantee for `B`
@@ -406,24 +337,22 @@ theorem B_trusts_protocol { h : ns_public evs }
induction h with induction h with
| Nil => simp_all | Nil => simp_all
| Fake _ a a_ih => | Fake _ a a_ih =>
right simp [*] at *
apply Fake_parts_sing at a apply Fake_parts_sing at a
simp at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁; apply Fake_parts_sing_helper (h := a) at h₁;
rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp at h₁ expand_parts_element at h₁
have _ := Spy_in_bad rcases h₂ with (_ | h₂) <;> simp_all[Spy_in_bad]
simp at h₂; rcases h₂ with (_ | h₂) <;> simp_all rcases h₁ with (((_ |_ ) | _) | _) <;> try simp_all
rcases h₁ with (((_ |_ ) | _) | _) <;> try (aapply a_ih) · right; aapply a_ih; aapply analz_subset_parts
· aapply analz_subset_parts
· apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₂ <;> simp_all · apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₂ <;> simp_all
· simp_all | NS1 => simp_all
| NS1 _ a a_ih => right; simp at h₂; simp at h₁; aapply a_ih; | NS2 _ nonce_not_used a a_ih =>
| NS2 _ _ a a_ih => right; simp at h₁; simp at h₂; cases h₂ with simp [*] at *
| inl => apply parts.body at h₁; apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used at h₁ apply parts_knows_Spy_subset_used_neg at nonce_not_used;
simp_all expand_parts_element at h₁; cases h₂ <;> simp_all
| inr => aapply a_ih
| NS3 _ _ a₂ a_ih => | NS3 _ _ a₂ a_ih =>
simp at h₂ simp [*] at *
simp at h₁; rw[parts_element, Set.subset_def] at h₁; simp at h₁ expand_parts_element at h₁
cases h₁ <;> simp_all cases h₁ <;> simp_all
have h₂c := h₂ have h₂c := h₂
apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₂c apply Spy_not_see_NB at h₂c
InductiveVerification/Public.lean
+13 -28
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import Init.Data.Nat.Lemmas
import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Basic import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Basic
import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Dist import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Dist
import Mathlib.Order.Defs.PartialOrder import Mathlib.Order.Defs.PartialOrder
set_option diagnostics true
-- Theory of Public Keys (common to all public-key protocols) -- Theory of Public Keys (common to all public-key protocols)
@@ -35,15 +34,18 @@ noncomputable abbrev pubK (A : Agent) : Key := pubEK A
noncomputable abbrev priK (A : Agent) : Key := invKey (pubEK A) noncomputable abbrev priK (A : Agent) : Key := invKey (pubEK A)
-- Axioms for private and public keys -- Axioms for private and public keys
@[simp]
axiom privateKey_neq_publicKey {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} : axiom privateKey_neq_publicKey {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} :
privateKey b A ≠ publicKey c A' privateKey b A ≠ publicKey c A'
@[simp]
lemma publicKey_neq_privateKey {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} : lemma publicKey_neq_privateKey {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} :
publicKey b A ≠ privateKey c A' := by publicKey b A ≠ privateKey c A' := by
exact privateKey_neq_publicKey.symm exact privateKey_neq_publicKey.symm
-- Basic properties of pubK and priK -- Basic properties of pubK and priK
omit [InvKey] in omit [InvKey] in
@[simp]
lemma publicKey_inject {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} : lemma publicKey_inject {b c : KeyMode} {A A' : Agent} :
(publicKey b A = publicKey c A') ↔ (b = c ∧ A = A') := by (publicKey b A = publicKey c A') ↔ (b = c ∧ A = A') := by
grind[injective_publicKey] grind[injective_publicKey]
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ by
lemma not_symKeys_priK {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} : lemma not_symKeys_priK {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} :
privateKey b A ∉ symKeys := by privateKey b A ∉ symKeys := by
simp [symKeys, privateKey, invKey_eq]; grind[privateKey_neq_publicKey]; simp [symKeys, privateKey, invKey_eq, privateKey_neq_publicKey]
lemma syKey_neq_priEK : lemma syKey_neq_priEK :
K ∈ symKeys → K ≠ priEK A := by K ∈ symKeys → K ≠ priEK A := by
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ omit [InvKey] in
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma publicKey_image_eq : lemma publicKey_image_eq :
(publicKey b x ∈ publicKey c '' AA) ↔ (b = c ∧ x ∈ AA) := by (publicKey b x ∈ publicKey c '' AA) ↔ (b = c ∧ x ∈ AA) := by
simp [Set.mem_image, publicKey_inject, And.comm, Eq.comm] simp [Set.mem_image, And.comm, Eq.comm]
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma privateKey_notin_image_publicKey : lemma privateKey_notin_image_publicKey :
@@ -252,22 +254,16 @@ lemma MPair_used {P : Prop} :
lemma keysFor_parts_initState {C : Agent} : lemma keysFor_parts_initState {C : Agent} :
keysFor (parts (initState C)) = ∅ := by keysFor (parts (initState C)) = ∅ := by
cases C <;> cases C <;>
simp[initState, keysFor] <;> simp[initState, keysFor]
repeat rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty] <;>
simp
lemma Crypt_notin_initState {B : Agent} : lemma Crypt_notin_initState {B : Agent} :
Msg.Crypt K X ∉ parts ( initState B ) := by Msg.Crypt K X ∉ parts ( initState B ) := by
cases B <;> simp[initState, priEK, priSK, shrK] <;> cases B <;> simp[initState, priEK, priSK]
apply And.intro <;> try apply And.intro
all_goals repeat rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty] <;>
simp
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma Crypt_notin_used_empty : lemma Crypt_notin_used_empty :
Msg.Crypt K X ∉ used [] := by Msg.Crypt K X ∉ used [] := by
simp[used]; intro A; cases A <;> simp <;> apply And.intro <;> try apply And.intro simp[used]; intro A; cases A <;> simp
all_goals (rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty] ; simp)
-- Basic properties of shrK -- Basic properties of shrK
@@ -324,10 +320,7 @@ lemma priK_in_initState {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} :
Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ initState A := by Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ initState A := by
induction A <;> induction A <;>
simp [HasInitState.initState, initState, privateKey, pubEK, pubSK] <;> simp [HasInitState.initState, initState, privateKey, pubEK, pubSK] <;>
cases b <;> cases b <;> simp[Spy_in_bad]
try simp
· left; left; right; exists Agent.Spy; apply And.intro; exact Spy_in_bad; rfl
· left; left; left; exists Agent.Spy; apply And.intro; exact Spy_in_bad; rfl
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma publicKey_in_initState {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} {B : Agent} : lemma publicKey_in_initState {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} {B : Agent} :
@@ -342,9 +335,7 @@ lemma publicKey_in_initState {b : KeyMode} {A : Agent} {B : Agent} :
lemma spies_pubK : Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ spies evs := by lemma spies_pubK : Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ spies evs := by
induction evs with induction evs with
| nil => simp [spies, knows] | nil => simp [spies, knows]
cases b cases b <;> tauto
· right; exists A
· left; right; exists A
| cons e evs ih => | cons e evs ih =>
cases e <;> rw [spies] <;> apply knows_subset_knows_Cons <;> assumption cases e <;> rw [spies] <;> apply knows_subset_knows_Cons <;> assumption
@@ -355,10 +346,7 @@ lemma analz_spies_pubK : Msg.Key (publicKey b A) ∈ analz (spies evs) := by
-- Spy sees private keys of bad agents -- Spy sees private keys of bad agents
lemma Spy_spies_bad_privateKey { h : A ∈ bad } : Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ spies evs := by lemma Spy_spies_bad_privateKey { h : A ∈ bad } : Msg.Key (privateKey b A) ∈ spies evs := by
induction evs with induction evs with
| nil => simp [spies, knows, pubSK, pubEK]; left; left | nil => simp_all [spies, knows, pubSK, pubEK]; cases b <;> tauto
cases b
· right; exists A
· left; exists A
| cons e evs ih => | cons e evs ih =>
cases e <;> rw[spies] <;> aapply knows_subset_knows_Cons cases e <;> rw[spies] <;> aapply knows_subset_knows_Cons
@@ -405,14 +393,11 @@ by simp[Crypt_synth_EK];
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma Nonce_notin_initState {B : Agent} : Msg.Nonce N ∉ parts (initState B) := by lemma Nonce_notin_initState {B : Agent} : Msg.Nonce N ∉ parts (initState B) := by
cases B <;> cases B <;>
simp [initState] <;> apply And.intro <;> try (apply And.intro) simp [initState]
all_goals (rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty]; simp)
@[simp] @[simp]
lemma Nonce_notin_used_empty : Msg.Nonce N ∉ used [] := by lemma Nonce_notin_used_empty : Msg.Nonce N ∉ used [] := by
simp [used]; intro A; cases A <;> simp <;> simp [used]; intro A; cases A <;> simp
apply And.intro <;> try (apply And.intro)
all_goals (rw[Set.singleton_def, parts_insert_Key, parts_empty]; simp)
-- Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems -- Supply fresh nonces for possibility theorems
lemma Nonce_supply_lemma : ∃ N, ∀ n, N ≤ n → Msg.Nonce n ∉ used evs := by lemma Nonce_supply_lemma : ∃ N, ∀ n, N ≤ n → Msg.Nonce n ∉ used evs := by